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Abstract
Committee scoring voting rules are multiwinner analogues of positional scoring rules which
constitute an important subclass of single-winner voting rules. We identify several natural
subclasses of committee scoring rules, namely, weakly separable, representation-focused, top-k-
counting, OWA-based, and decomposable rules. We characterize SNTV, Bloc, and k-Approval
Chamberlin–Courant as the only nontrivial rules in pairwise intersections of these classes. We
provide some axiomatic characterizations for these classes, where monotonicity properties appear
to be especially useful. The class of decomposable rules is new to the literature. We show
that it strictly contains the class of OWA-based rules and describe some of the applications of
decomposable rules.
1 Introduction
Axiomatic studies of multiwinner voting rules go back to Felsenthal and Maoz [35] and Debord [22],
but a systematic work on the topic has began only recently and on several different fronts. New
results appear within social choice theory, computer science, artificial intelligence, and a number of
other fields (see the work of Faliszewski et al. [33] for more details on the history as well as recent
progress). The reason for this explosion of interest from a number of research communities is the
wide range of applications of multiwinner voting rules on the one hand, and the corresponding
richness and diversity of the spectrum of those rules on the other. Typically, social-choice theorists
study normative properties of various multiwinner rules, computer scientists investigate feasibility of
computing the election results, and researchers working within artificial intelligence use multiwinner
elections as a versatile tool (e.g., useful in genetic algorithms [29], for ranking search results [77],
or for providing personalized recommendations [51]). Yet, there is a growing interplay between
these areas and an increased need for a new level of comprehension of results obtained in all of
∗A preliminary version of this paper appeared in the Proceedings of the 25th International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-16) [30].
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them. In this paper we partially address this need by linking syntactic features of certain families
of committee scoring rules with their normative properties. The syntactic features of the rules are
useful, e.g., for establishing their computational properties [74, 31], or for viewing those rules as
achieving certain optimization goals (which allows one to consider these rules as tools for certain
tasks from artificial intelligence and operation research). The normative properties, on the other
hand, are useful for understanding the ‘behavior’ of these rules and the settings for which they may
be appropriate.
The model of multiwinner elections studied in this paper is as follows. We are given a set of
candidates, a collection of voters—each with a preference order in which the candidates are ranked
from the best to the worst—and an integer k. A multiwinner rule maps this input to a subset of
k candidates (i.e., a committee; we discuss tie-breaking later) that, in some sense, best reflects the
voters’ preferences. For example, the Single Non-Transferable Vote rule (the SNTV rule) chooses k
candidates that are top-ranked most frequently, whereas the Bloc rule selects k candidates that are
ranked most frequently among top k positions (equivalently, under Bloc each voter names members
of his or her favorite committee, and those that are mentioned most often are selected). Naturally,
there are many other multiwinner rules to choose from, defined in various ways.
In this paper we focus on the class of committee scoring rules, introduced by Elkind et al. [25] as
multiwinner generalizations of classic positional scoring rules. The main idea of committee scoring
rules is essentially the same as in the single-winner case: Each voter gives each committee a score
based on the positions of members of this committee in the voter’s ranking, scores from individual
voters are aggregated into the societal scores of the committees, and the committee(s) with the
highest score wins. Committee scoring rules appear to form a remarkably rich class that includes
both very simple rules, such as SNTV and Bloc, and rather sophisticated ones, such as the rule of
Chamberlin and Courant [17] or variants of the Proportional Approval Voting rule [46]. As these
rules tend to be very different in nature, they are suitable for different purposes, such as selecting a
diverse committee, selecting a committee that proportionally represents the electorate, or selecting
a committee consisting of k individually best candidates. This richness is the main strength of the
class of committee scoring rules, but to choose rules for given settings wisely, it is important to
understand the internal structure of the class. Understanding this structure is the main goal of the
current paper.
So far, researchers have identified the following subclasses of committee scoring rules (we provide
their formal definitions in Sections 2 and 3; here we give intuitions only). (Weakly) separable rules,
introduced by Elkind et al. [25], are those rules where we compute a separate score for each
candidate (using a single-winner scoring rule) and then pick k candidates with the top scores (for
example, using Plurality scores leads to SNTV).1 Representation-focused rules, also introduced by
Elkind et al. [25], are similar in spirit to the Chamberlin–Courant rule, whose aim is to ensure that
in the elected committee each voter’s most preferred committee member (his or her representative)
is ranked as high as possible. On the other hand, top-k-counting rules, introduced by Faliszewski
et al. [31], capture rules where each voter evaluates the quality of a committee by the number of
members of that committee that he or she ranks among the top k ones; Bloc is a prime example of
a top-k-counting rule. Finally, the class of OWA-based rules—introduced by Skowron et al. [74],
also studied in the approval-based election model [2, 5, 49]—contains all the previously mentioned
classes. Under these rules a voter calculates the score of a committee as the ordered weighted
1If the underlying single-winner scoring rule does not depend on the size of the committee (as in the case of SNTV)
then the rule is referred to as separable. If there is such dependence (as in the case of Bloc), then the rule is weakly
separable.
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average (OWA) of the scores of the candidates in that committee.2 In this paper we also introduce
the class of decomposable committee scoring rules that strictly contains all the OWA-based ones,
has interesting applications, and appears to be easier to work with axiomatically.
All these classes have been defined purely in terms of the syntactic features of the functions used
to calculate the scores of the committees.3 These syntactic features are important if, for example,
one wants to assess some computational properties of the rules (e.g., it is known that weakly
separable rules are polynomial-time computable [25], that representation-focused rules tend to be
NP-hard to compute [65, 51, 74], and that the structure of the functions used within OWA-based
rules affects the ability to compute their results approximately [74]). Such syntactic features are
also essential when we view committee scoring rules as specifying optimization goals for particular
applications (for example, since under the Chamberlin–Courant rule each voter’s score depends
solely on his or her representative in the elected committee, this rule is particularly suitable in
the context of deliberative democracy [17], for targeted advertising [51, 52], or for certain facility
location problems [86]). Nonetheless, these syntactic features do not tell us much about the behavior
of the rules.
Our first result reinforces the syntactic hierarchy of committee scoring rules. We show that
the class of committee scoring rules strictly contains the class of decomposable rules, which, in
turn, strictly contains the class of OWA-based ones, and that the class of OWA-based rules strictly
contains the classes of (weakly) separable rules, representation-focused rules, and top-k-counting
rules. For each pair of the latter three classes, we show that their intersection contains exactly one,
previously-known, non-trivial voting rule. See Figure 1 for a visualization of the syntactic hierarchy
of committee scoring rules.
Our second, and the main, result establishes a link between several levels of the syntactic hierar-
chy and respective normative properties. In other words, we establish axiomatic characterizations
of some of the studied subclasses of committee scoring rules. Until now, the only result of this form,
which is due to Faliszewski et al. [31], was a characterization of fixed-majority consistent commit-
tee scoring rules as those top-k-counting rules whose scoring functions satisfy (a relaxed variant
of) the convexity property. Here, our main result is that many of the syntactic properties of our
rules nicely correspond to certain types of monotonicity. Specifically, we focus on the committee
enlargement monotonicity4 property, which requires that if we increase the size of the committee
sought in the election, then the new winning committee should be a superset of the old winning
committee, and on variants of the non-crossing monotonicity property, which requires that if we
shift forward some members of a winning committee within any vote in a way that does not affect
the positions of the remaining members of this committee, then this committee should still win.
We show that committee enlargement monotonicity characterizes exactly the class of separable
rules among committee scoring rules, and that non-crossing monotonicity characterizes the class
of weakly separable ones. Then we introduce top-member monotonicity (a variant of non-crossing
monotonicity restricted within each vote to shifting only the highest-ranked member of the winning
committee) and show that together with narrow-top consistency (which requires that if there are
at most k candidates that are ever ranked in the top position within a vote, then these candidates
should belong to the winning committee) it characterizes the class of representation-focused rules.
2See the original work of Yager [82] for a general discussion of OWAs, and, e.g., the works of Kacprzyk et al. [45]
or Goldsmith et al. [41] for their other applications in voting.
3A notable exception is the class of top-k-counting rules which were discovered while characterizing those com-
mittee scoring rules that satisfy the fixed-majority property [31].
4This notion is also known as committee monotonicity [25] and enlargement consistency [7]. We chose a name
that is more informative than the former, but which is not tied to the realm of resolute rules, as the latter. In the
literature on apportionment rules, a related property is often called house monotonicity [66, 6].
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Finally, we show that if a committee rule is prefix-monotone (i.e., satisfies a yet another restricted
variant of non-crossing monotonicity) then it must be decomposable.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model of multiwinner elections,
define the class of committee scoring rules, provide their basic properties, and show several examples
of committee scoring rules. Section 3 is devoted to structural properties of classes of committee
scoring rules. Here we build the hierarchy of the classes and show results regarding containments
and intersections among these classes. In Section 4 we switch to axiomatic properties of the rules
in the classes of the hierarchy and give several axiomatic characterizations of those classes. Finally,
we discuss related work in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6.
2 Multiwinner Elections and Committee Scoring Rules
In this section we set the stage for the discussions provided throughout the rest of the paper by
providing preliminary definitions as well as introducing the class of committee scoring rules. For
each positive integer t, we write [t] to denote {1, . . . , t}. By R+ we mean the set of nonnegative
real numbers.
2.1 Preliminaries
An election is a pair E = (C, V ), where C = {c1, . . . , cm} is a set of candidates and V = (v1, . . . , vn)
is a collection of voters. Each voter vi has a preference order ≻i, expressing his or her ranking
of the candidates, from the most desirable one to the least desirable one. Given a voter v and a
candidate c, by posv(c) we mean the position of c in v’s preference order (the top-ranked candidate
has position 1, the next one has position 2, and so on).
A multiwinner voting rule is a function R that given an election E = (C, V ) and a committee
size k, 1 ≤ k ≤ |C|, returns a family R(E, k) of size-k subsets of C, i.e., the set of committees that
tie as winners of the election (we use the nonunique-winner model or, in other words, we assume
that multiwinner rules are irresolute). We provide a few concrete examples of multiwinner rules in
Section 2.2.
Most of the multiwinner rules that we study are based on single-winner scoring functions.
A single-winner scoring function for m candidates is a nonincreasing function γ : [m] → R+ that
assigns a score value to each position in a preference order. Given a preference order ≻i and a
candidate c, by the γ-score of c (given by voter vi) we mean the value γ(posvi(c)). The two most
commonly used scoring functions are the Borda scoring function,
βm(i) = m− i,
and the t-approval scoring function,
αt(i) =
{
1 if i ≤ t
0 otherwise.
In particular, α1 is known as the Plurality scoring function.
Committee scoring functions generalize single-winner scoring functions to the multiwinner set-
ting in a natural way, by assigning scores to the positions of the whole committees. Formally,
given a vote v and a committee S of size k, the committee position of S in v, denoted posv(S), is
a sequence (i1, . . . , ik) that results from sorting the set {posv(c) | c ∈ S} in the increasing order.
We write [m]k to denote the set of all such length-k increasing sequences of numbers from [m] (in
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other words, we write [m]k to denote the set of all possible committee positions for the case of m
candidates and committees of size k). Given two committee positions from [m]k, I = (i1, . . . , ik)
and J = (j1, . . . , jk), we say that I weakly dominates J , I  J , if for each t ∈ [k], it holds that
it ≤ jt (we say that I dominates J , denoted I ≻ J , if at least one of these inequalities is strict
5).
Below we define committee scoring functions formally.
Definition 2.1 (Elkind et al. [25]). A committee scoring function for m candidates and a committee
size k is a function fm,k : [m]k → R+ such that for each two sequences I, J ∈ [m]k, if I weakly
dominates J then h(I) ≥ h(J).
Let f = (fm,k)k≤m be a family of committee scoring functions, where each fm,k is a function
for m candidates and committees of size k. Given an election E = (C, V ) with m candidates and
a committee S of size k, we define the fm,k-score of S to be:
fm,k-scoreE(S) =
∑
vi∈V
fm,k(posvi(S)).
When f is clear from the context, we often speak of the score of a committee instead of its f -score.
Given the above notation, we are ready to define committee scoring rules formally.
Definition 2.2. Let f = (fm,k)k≤m be a family of committee scoring functions (with one function
for each m and k, k ≤ m). Committee scoring rule Rf is a multiwinner voting rule that given an
election E = (C, V ) and committee size k, outputs all size-k committees with the highest f|C|,k-score.
We say that a committee scoring rule Rf is degenerate if there is a number of candidates m
and a committee size k such that fm,k is a constant function. As a consequence, a degenerate rule
returns all size-k committees for every election with m candidates. The trivial committee scoring
rule is a degenerate rule that returns the set of all size-k committees for all elections and all sizes
k (naturally, it is defined by a family of constant functions).
2.2 Examples of Committee Scoring Rules
Many well-known multiwinner rules are, in fact, committee scoring rules; below we provide several
such examples. For each of the rules we provide the family of committee scoring functions used in
its definition, discuss these functions intuitively, and mention some applications.
SNTV, Bloc, and k-Borda. These three rules use the following committee scoring functions:
fSNTVm,k (i1, . . . , ik) =
∑k
t=1 α1(it) = α1(i1),
fBlocm,k (i1, . . . , ik) =
∑k
t=1 αk(it), and
fk-Bordam,k (i1, . . . , ik) =
∑k
t=1 βm(it).
That is, under the SNTV rule we choose k candidates with the highest Plurality scores,
under Bloc we choose k candidates with the highest k-Approval scores, and under k-Borda
we choose k candidates with the highest Borda scores. On the intuitive level, under SNTV
each voter names his or her favorite committee member, under Bloc each voter names all
the k members of his or her favorite committee, and under k-Borda each voter ranks all the
5In previous papers on committee scoring rules, the notions of weak dominance and dominance were conflated.
We believe that giving them clear, separate meanings will help in providing more crisp arguments and discussions.
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candidates and assigns them scores in a way which corresponds linearly to their position in
the ranking. SNTV and Bloc are sometimes used in political elections (with the former used,
e.g., in the parliamentary elections in Puerto Rico, and with the latter often used for various
local elections in many countries). k-Borda and other rules based on similar scoring schemes
are often used to determine finalists of competitions (e.g., the finalists of the Eurovision Song
Contest are selected using a system very close to k-Borda).
The Chamberlin–Courant rule. Under the Chamberlin–Courant rule (the β-CC rule), the
score that a voter v assigns to a committee S depends only on how v ranks his or her favorite
member of S (referred to as v’s representative in S). The Chamberlin–Courant rule seeks
committees in which each voter ranks his or her representative as high as possible. Formally,
the rule uses functions:
fβ-CCm,k (i1, . . . , ik) = βm(i1).
This is the variant of the rule originally proposed by Chamberlin and Courant [17], but,
subsequently, other authors (e.g., Procaccia et al. [65], Betzler at al. [9], and Faliszewski et
al. [34]) considered other ones, based on other single-winner scoring functions. In particular,
we will be interested in the k-Approval Chamberlin–Courant rule, (αk-CC) which is defined
through functions:
fαk-CCm,k (i1, . . . , ik) = αk(i1).
Intuitively, both variants of the Chamberlin–Courant rule seek committees of diverse candi-
dates that “cover” as broad a spectrum of voters’ views as possible. Lu and Boutilier [51]
considered the rule in the context of recommendation systems.
The PAV rule. The Proportional Approval Voting rule (the PAV rule) was originally defined
by Thiele [80] in the approval setting (where instead of ranking the candidates, the voters
indicate which ones they accept as committee members; for recent discussions of the rule see
the overview of Kilgour [46] and the works of Aziz et al. [2] and Lackner and Skowron [49]).
We model it as a committee scoring rule αt-PAV, where t is a parameter, defined using scoring
functions of the form:
fαt-PAVm,k (i1, . . . , ik) = αt(i1) +
1
2αt(i2) +
1
3αt(i3) + · · · +
1
k
αt(ik).
PAV is particularly well-suited for electing parliaments. Indeed, Brill et al. [14] have shown
that it generalizes the d’Hondt apportionment method, which is used for this purpose in
many countries (e.g., in France and Poland). A number of recent works [2, 14, 49, 4] explain
why the harmonic sequence used within the PAV scoring function ensures that the elected
committee represents the voters proportionally.
Naturally, there are many other committee scoring rules, and we will discuss some of them
throughout the paper. Nonetheless, the above few suffice to illustrate our main points. There is
also a number of other multiwinner rules that are not committee scoring rules, such as STV (see,
e.g., the work of Tideman and Richardson [81]), Monroe [56], Minimax Approval Voting [10], or
rules which are stable in the sense of Gehrlein [40]. We do not discuss them in this paper, but we
provide some literature pointers in Section 5.
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2.3 Basic Features of Committee Scoring Rules
The class of committee scoring rules is very rich and there are only a few basic properties shared by
all the rules in this class. Below we discuss several such properties that will be useful throughout
this paper.
From our point of view, the most important common feature of committee scoring rules is that
they are uniquely defined by their scoring functions (up to linear transformations). Formally, we
have the following lemma (we provide the proof in the appendix).
Lemma 2.1. Let Rf and Rg be two committee scoring rules defined by committee scoring functions
f = (fm,k)k≤m and g = (gm,k)k≤m, respectively. If Rf = Rg then for each m and k, k ≤ m, there
are two values, am,k ∈ R+ and bm,k ∈ R, such that for each I ∈ [m]k we have that fm,k(I) =
am,k · gm,k(I) + bm,k.
Due to Lemma 2.1, to show that two committee scoring rules are distinct it suffices to show
that their scoring functions are not linearly related. In particular, this will be very useful when we
will be showing that certain rules cannot be represented using scoring functions of a given form.
The second common feature of committee scoring rules is nonimposition, which requires that
for every committee there is some election where it wins uniquely. Formally, we have the following
definition.
Definition 2.3. Let R be a multiwinner rule. We say that R has the nonimposition property
if for each candidate set C and each subset W of C, there is an election E = (C, V ) such that
R(E, |W |) = {W}.
Nonimposition is such a basic property that it is hardly surprising that all non-degenerate
committee scoring rules satisfy it. We prove the next lemma in the appendix.
Lemma 2.2. Let Rf be a committee scoring rule defined by a family of committee scoring functions
f = (fm,k)k≤m. Rf satisfies the nonimposition property if and only if every committee scoring
function in f is nontrivial.
While at first sight nonimposition and Lemma 2.2 seem hardly exciting, in fact they are suffi-
cient to illustrate intriguing differences between single-winner voting rules and their multiwinner
counterparts. For example, one can verify that all nontrivial single-winner scoring rules satisfy the
following extended variant of the nonimposition property: For every candidate set C and its subset
S, there is an election E = (C, V ) where exactly the candidates from S tie as winners. Analogous
result does not hold for committee scoring rules, even for the case of two committees (in which case
it could be dubbed as 2-nonimposition; the example below is due to Lackner and Skowron [49]).
Example 2.1. Let us fix some committee size k and a set C containing at least 2k candidates.
Consider two disjoint committees W1 and W2. Let E be an arbitrary election where W1 and W2
are tied as winners according to Bloc (such elections exist). We note that each candidate in W1
has exactly the same k-Approval score as each candidate in W2 (otherwise at least one of these
committees would not be winning). Consequently, every size-k committee W such that W ⊆W1∪W2
is also winning in E, so W1 and W2 are not the two unique winning committees.
The fact that in general 2-nonimposition does not hold for committee scoring rules is quite
disappointing because many results would be far easier to prove if we could assume that it is
always possible to construct an election where two arbitrary given committees are the only winning
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ones. On the other hand, it is possible to construct elections where two size-k committees W1 and
W2 are the only winning ones, provided that they share k − 1 candidates (and, indeed, this fact is
used in the proof of Lemma 2.1).
There are a few more common properties of committee scoring rules. For example, they all
satisfy the candidate monotonicity property which requires that if we shift forward a member of a
winning committee then, afterward, this candidate still belongs to some winning committee (but
possibly quite a different one; see the work of Bredereck et al. [12]). Also, all committee scoring
rules are consistent in the sense that if two elections E1 and E2 (over the same candidate set) have
some common winning committees, then these are exactly the winning committees in an election
obtained by merging the voter collections of E1 and E2. The former property is related to our
discussions in Section 4 and the latter one is often useful as a tool when proving various results
(and, indeed, it is crucial in characterizing the class of committee scoring rules axiomatically [76]).
2.4 The T-Shirt Store Example
In Section 2.2 we have provided a number of examples of committee scoring rules and we have
discussed some of their applications, focusing mostly on political elections. However, committee
scoring rules have far more varied applications (see, e.g., the overview of Faliszewski et al. [33]),
most of which have nothing to do with politics. Below we describe a simplified business-inspired
scenario where committee scoring rules may be useful. We use this example to guide our way
through the different types of committee scoring rules discussed in this paper.
Example 2.2. Consider a T-shirt store that needs to decide which shirts to put on offer. Let C be
the set of T-shirts that the store can order from its suppliers (|C| = m). Since the store has limited
space, it can only put k different T-shirts on display, and it wants to pick them in a way that would
maximize its revenue (i.e., the number of T-shirts sold). We assume that every customer knows
all the designs (say, from a website) and ranks all T-shirts from the best one to the worst one. Let
us say that a customer considers a T-shirt to be “very good” if it is among the top k T-shirts (of
course, this is an arbitrary choice, made for the sake of simplifying the example).
How should the store decide which T-shirts to put on display? This depends on how the cus-
tomers behave. Consider a customer that ranks the available T-shirts on positions i1 < i2 < · · · <
ik. If this is a very picky customer that only buys a T-shirt if it is the very best among all possible
ones (according to his or her opinion) then the number of T-shirts this customer buys is given by
fSNTVm,k (i1, . . . , ik) = α1(i1). However, if this customer were to buy one copy of each T-shirt he or
she considered as “very good,” he or she would buy fBlocm,k (i1, . . . , ik) =
∑k
t=1 αk(it) T-shirts. It is
also possible that a customer would buy only one T -shirt, provided he or she considered it as “very
good.” The number of T-shirts bought by such a customer would be fαk-CCm,k (i1, . . . , ik) = αk(i1).
Depending on which type of customers the store expects to have, it should choose its selection of
T-shirts either using SNTV, Bloc, or k-Approval Chamberlin–Courant. (Surely, other types of cus-
tomers are possible as well and we will discuss some of them later. It is also likely that the store
would face a mixture of different types of customers, but this is beyond our study.)
3 Hierarchy of Committee Scoring Rules
In this section we describe the classes of committee scoring rules that were studied to date, introduce
a new class—the class of decomposable rules—and argue how all these classes relate to each other,
forming a hierarchy. In Figure 1 we present the relations between the classes discussed in this
8
committee scoring rules
max-threshold rules, ℓp-Borda
decomposable
multithreshold rules
OWA-based
αt-PAV, q-HarmonicBorda
representation-focused
β-CC
weakly separable
k-Borda
top-k-counting
αk-PAV, Perfectionist
Bloc
αk-CCSNTV
Trivial
Figure 1: The hierarchy of committee scoring rules.
section, with examples of notable rules. The classes are defined by setting restrictions on the
scoring functions so, in other words, in this section we are interested in the syntactic hierarchy of
committee scoring rules. Later, in Section 4, we will consider semantic properties.
3.1 Separable and Weakly Separable Rules
We say that a family of committee scoring functions f = (fm,k)k≤m is weakly separable if there
exists a family of (single-winner) scoring functions (γm,k)k≤m with γm,k : [m] → R+ such that for
every m ∈ N and every committee position I = (i1, . . . , ik) ∈ [m]k we have:
fm,k(i1, . . . , ik) =
∑k
t=1 γm,k(it).
A committee scoring rule Rf is weakly separable if it is defined through a family of weakly separable
scoring functions f . In other words, if a rule is weakly separable then we can compute the score
of each candidate independently, using the single-winner scoring function γm,k, and pick the k
candidates with the highest scores. In consequence, it is possible to compute winning committees
for all weakly separable rules in polynomial time, provided that their underlying single-winner
scoring functions are polynomial-time computable [25].6
If for all m we have γm,1 = · · · = γm,m, then we say that the family f and the corresponding
committee scoring rule Rf are separable, without the “weakly” qualification. Thus, separable rules
use the same scoring function for each value of the size of a committee to be elected. Interestingly,
6There is a subtlety here as there may be exponentially many winning committees. However, by listing the
scores of all the candidates, we provide enough information to, e.g., enumerate all the winning committees in time
proportional to the number of these committees, or to perform many other tasks related to winner determination
(such as computing the score of a winning committee).
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separable rules have some axiomatic properties that other weakly separable rules lack [25]—we will
discuss this further in Section 4.
The notion of (weakly) separable rules was introduced by Elkind et al. [25]; they pointed out
that SNTV and k-Borda are separable, whereas Bloc is only weakly separable.
3.2 Representation-Focused Rules
A family of committee scoring functions f = (fm,k)k≤m is representation-focused if there exists
a family of (single-winner) scoring functions (γm,k)k≤m such that for every m ∈ N and every
committee position I = (i1, . . . , ik) ∈ [m]k we have:
fm,k(i1, . . . , ik) = γm,k(i1).
This means that the score that a committee receives from a voter depends only on the position of
the most preferred member of this committee in the voter’s preference ranking—such a member
can be viewed as a representative of the voter in the committee. A committee scoring rule Rf
is representation-focused if it is defined through a family of representation-focused scoring func-
tions f . The notion of representation-focused rules was introduced by Elkind et al. [25]; β-CC is
the archetypal example of a representation-focused committee scoring rule and, in consequence, all
the representation-focused rules can be seen as variants of the Chamberlin–Courant rule.
SNTV is both separable and representation-focused, and it is the only non-degenerate committee
scoring rule with this property.
Proposition 3.1. SNTV is the only non-degenerate committee scoring rule that is (weakly) sepa-
rable and representation-focused.
Proof. It is easy to verify that SNTV is separable and representation-focused. For the other direc-
tion, let R be a rule which is separable and representation focused. It follows that R ≡ Rf ≡ Rg
for some families of committee scoring functions f and g, such that fm,k(i1, . . . , ik) = φm,k(i1) +
. . .+φm,k(ik) and g(i1, . . . , ik) = γm,k(i1). Every linear transformation of g has the same form (i.e.,
it only depends on i1), so by Lemma 2.1 (linearly transforming g, if necessary) we can assume that
f = g.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that m > k. For each committee positions (i1, . . . , ik)
with i1 = 1, we have that
φm,k(i1) + . . . + φm,k(ik) = γm,k(i1),
and, so, we can conclude that f1(2) = · · · = f1(m). Since R is non-degenerate, we have that
f1(1) > f1(m), and so that f1(1) > f1(2). This is sufficient to conclude that R is equivalent to
SNTV.
Generally, representation-focused rules are NP-hard to compute (SNTV is one obvious ex-
ception). This fact was first shown by Procaccia et al. [65] in the approval-based setting,
and then by Lu and Boutilier [51] for β-CC. Since then, various means of computing the
results under the Chamberlin–Courant rule and its variants were studied in quite some de-
tail [9, 20, 75, 78, 59, 34, 48, 28].
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3.3 Top-k-Counting Rules
A committee scoring rule Rf , defined by a family f = (fm,k)k≤m, is top-k-counting if there exists
a sequence of nondecreasing functions (gm,k)k≤m, with gm,k : {0, . . . , k} → R+, such that:
fm,k(i1, . . . , ik) = gm,k
(∣∣{it | it ≤ k}∣∣).
That is, the value fm,k(i1, . . . , ik) depends only on the number of committee members that the
given voter ranks among his or her top k positions. We refer to the functions gm,k as the counting
functions. Top-k-counting rules were introduced by Faliszewski et al. [31].
Remark 1. It would be quite natural to require that all counting functions for a given committee
size were the same, that is, that for each k ∈ N it held that gk,k = gk+1,k = gk+2,k = · · · . Following
Faliszewski et al. [31], we formally do not make this requirement, but we expect it to hold for all
natural top-k-counting rules.
Top-k-counting rules include, for example, the Bloc rule, αk-PAV, and αk-CC, where Bloc uses
the linear counting functions gBlocm,k (i) = i, αk-PAV uses counting functions g
αk-PAV
m,k (i) =
∑i
t=1
1
t
,
and αk-CC uses counting functions:
gCCm,k(i) =
{
1 if i ≥ 1
0 if i = 0.
As an extreme example of a top-k-counting rule, Faliszewski et al. [31] introduced the Perfectionist
rule, which uses counting functions:
gPerfm,k (i) =
{
1 if i = k
0 otherwise
Perfectionist is extreme in the sense that a voter assigns a point to a committee exactly if he or
she ranks all the members of this committee as k best ones.
Example 3.1. Let us recall our T-shirt store example (Example 2.2). Consider a particularly
snobbish customer, who is willing to buy a shirt from a store only if he or she views all the available
shirts as very good (recall that we defined “very good” to mean being ranked among top k positions).
Then if i1, . . . , ik are the positions of the available shirts in the customer’s ranking, the number of
shirts that the store should expect to sell to such a customer is:
fm,k(i1, . . . , ik) = g
Perf
m,k
(∣∣{it | it ≤ k}∣∣) = αk(ik).
Thus if the store expects such customers, then it should use the Perfectionist rule to choose its
merchandise (and, possibly, should also increase its prices!).
Bloc is the only nontrivial rule that is both weakly separable and top-k-counting, and αk-CC
is the only nontrivial rule that is both representation-focused and top-k-counting.
Proposition 3.2. Bloc is the only nontrivial rule that is weakly separable and top-k-counting.
Proof. By combining Lemma 2.1 and the results of Faliszewski et al. [31], we obtain that top-k-
counting rule defined by a family of linear counting functions is the only weakly separable top-k-
counting rule, and this rule is exactly Bloc.
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Proposition 3.3. αk-CC is the only nontrivial rule that is representation-focused and top-k-
counting.
Proof. It is easy to verify that αk-CC is top-k-counting and representation-focused. For the other
direction, let R be a rule which is both top-k-counting and representation focused. It follows that
R ≡ Rf ≡ Rg for two functions, f and g, such that, f(i1, . . . , ik) = f1(i1) and g(i1, . . . , ik) = g1(s),
where s =
∣∣{it | it ≤ k}∣∣. Since any linear transformation of f has the same form, by the uniqueness
we can assume that f = g.
For each i ∈ [m− k+1] let L(i) denote the sequence (i,m− k+2,m− k+3, . . . ,m). For each
i, j > k we have that:
f1(i) = f(L(i)) = g(L(i)) = g(L(j)) = f(L(j)) = f1(j).
By the same reasoning, we can prove that for each i, j ≤ k we have f1(i) = f1(j). Since the rule is
nontrivial, we know that for some i, j it holds that f1(i) 6= f1(j). This is sufficient to claim that R
is equivalent to αk-CC.
Faliszewski et al. [31] show that top-k-counting rules tend to be NP-hard to compute, but point
out several polynomial-time computable exceptions, including Bloc and Perfectionist. They also
observe that for rules with concave counting functions there are polynomial-time constant-factor
approximation algorithms, whereas for rules with convex counting functions such algorithms may
be missing (under standard complexity-theoretic assumptions).
3.4 OWA-Based Rules
Skowron et al. [74] introduced a class of multiwinner rules based on ordered weighted average
(OWA) operators. Similar rules for approval-based ballots were first considered in the 19th century
by Thiele [80] and more recently were studied by Aziz et al. [2, 5] and Lackner and Skowron [49]
(see also the discussion by Kilgour [46]). Elkind and Ismaili [26] use OWA operators to define a
different class of multiwinner rules, which we do not consider in this paper.
We provide intuition for the OWA-based rules by using our T-shirts store example.
Example 3.2. Let us say that a customer views a T-shirt as “good enough” if it is among the
top 10% of the shirts available on the market. Suppose that a customer identifies the best T-shirt
available in the store and buys it with probability 1, provided it is “good enough”. Then he or she
also finds the second best T-shirt and buys it with probability 1/2 (again, provided that it is “good
enough”), the third best shirt with probability 1/3, and so on, all the way to the k’th best T-shirt,
which he or she buys with probability 1/k (if it is “good enough”). If i1, . . . , ik are the positions (in
the customer’s preference order) of the T-shirts that the store puts on display, then the expected
number of T-shirts he or she buys is given by the function:
fm,k(i1, . . . , ik) = 1 · α0.10m(i1) + 1/2 · α0.10m(i2) + · · ·+ 1/k · α0.10m(ik).
Thus, to maximize its revenue, the store should find a winning committee for the election where
the T-shirts are the candidates, the voters are the customers, and where we use committee scoring
rule Rf based on f = (fm,k)k≤m. This multiwinner voting rule is α0.10m-PAV, a variant of the
Proportional Approval Voting rule.
Now let us define OWA-based rules formally. An OWA operator Λ of dimension k is a sequence
Λ = (λ1, . . . , λk) of nonnegative real numbers.
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Definition 3.1. Let Λ = (Λm,k)k≤m be a sequence of OWA operators such that Λm,k =
(λm,k1 , . . . , λ
m,k
k ) has dimension k. Let γ = (γm,k)k≤m be a family of single-winner scoring func-
tions. Then, γ and Λ define a family f = (fm,k)k≤m of committee scoring functions such that for
each (i1, . . . , ik) ∈ [m]k we have:
fm,k(i1, . . . , ik) =
∑k
t=1 λ
m,k
t γm,k(it).
We refer to committee scoring rules Rf defined through f in this way as OWA-based.
It is known that weakly separable, representation-focused, and top-k-counting rules are OWA-
based. The first class is defined using OWA operators (1, . . . , 1), the second one uses OWA operators
(1, 0, . . . , 0), and the last one contains rules that use k-Approval single-winner scoring functions and
any OWA operator (the argument that shows this is due to Faliszewski et al. [31, Proposition 3]
and requires a bit more effort than for the previous two classes). As a corollary to the preceding
propositions, we get the following.
Corollary 3.4. Each of the classes of separable, top-k-counting, and representation-focused rules
is strictly contained in the class of OWA-based rules.
Proof. Containment follows from the paragraph above. Strictness follows as we have Bloc as the
unique rule in the intersection of top-k-counting and weakly separable; SNTV as the unique rule in
the intersection of weakly separable and representation-focused; and αk-CC as the unique rule in the
intersection of top-k-counting and representation-focused: it follows that Bloc is not representation-
focused; SNTV is not top-k-counting; and αk-CC is not weakly separable. We get the claim by
noticing that Bloc, SNTV, and αk-CC, are all OWA-based.
Naturally, there are also OWA-based rules that do not belong to any of the above-mentioned
classes. For example, this is the case for αt-PAV rules (provided that the parameter t is not equal
to the committee size k, e.g., if it is fixed as a constant) or for the related q-HarmonicBorda rules
(the q-HB rules), defined by the following scoring functions (q ∈ R+ is a parameter):
f q-HBm,k (i1, . . . , ik) = βm(i1) +
1
2q βm(i2) +
1
3q βm(i3) + · · · +
1
kq
βm(ik).
The q-HarmonicBorda rules were introduced by Faliszewski et al. [32], who were looking for various
means of achieving a compromise between the k-Borda rule and the Chamberlin–Courant rule
(0-HB is k-Borda, and as q becomes larger and larger, q-HB becomes more and more similar to
β-CC).
Proposition 3.5. Neither αt-PAV nor q-HB is weakly separable, nor representation-focused, nor
top-k-counting, for any choice of constants t ∈ N and q ∈ R+.
To prove Proposition 3.5 it suffices to show that the committee scoring functions of these rules
cannot be expressed as linear transformations of weakly separable, representation-focused, and
top-k-counting scoring functions, and invoke Lemma 2.1. We omit the details of this simple but
somewhat tedious task.
Skowron et al. [74] have shown that OWA-based rules are typically NP-hard to compute (with
the clear exception of, e.g., weakly separable rules and the Perfectionist rule). They have also
linked the properties of the OWA operators with the ability to approximate the rules (generally
speaking, if the OWA operators for a given rule are non-increasing then there are polynomial-time
constant-factor approximation algorithms for this rule, and otherwise they are typically missing7).
7However, there are exceptions. For example, viewed as an OWA-based rule, Perfectionist uses OWA operators
(0, . . . , 0, 1) but still is polynomial-time computable. This is because, as a top-k-counting rule, Perfectionist uses a
very restrictive single-winner scoring function, and is not captured by the results of Skowron et al. [74].
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3.5 Decomposable Rules
We introduce the following class that naturally generalizes the class of OWA-based rules and resort
to our T-shirt store example to help the reader rationalize it.
Definition 3.2. Let γ = (γ
(t)
m,k)t≤k≤m be a family of single-winner scoring functions. These func-
tions define a family of committee scoring functions f = (fm,k)k≤m such that for each committee
position (i1, . . . , ik) ∈ [m]k we have:
fm,k(i1, . . . , ik) =
∑k
t=1 γ
(t)
m,k(it).
We refer to committee scoring rules Rf defined through f in this way as decomposable.
At first glance, decomposable rules seem very similar to the weakly separable ones. The differ-
ence is that for fixed m and k and two different values t and t′, for decomposable rules the functions
γ
(t)
m,k and γ
(t′)
m,k can be completely different. It is apparent that OWA-based rules are decomposable.
We will see that this containment is strict.
Example 3.3. Let us recall from Example 3.2 that a customer considers a T-shirt to be “good
enough” if it is among the best 10% of all shirts and let us say that a shirt is “great” if it is among
the top 1% of all shirts. A customer buys two “great” T-shirts, or one “at least good enough” T-shirt
(if there are no two “great” T-shirts on display). Naturally, the customer picks the best T-shirt(s)
he can find (respecting the above constraints). If i1, . . . , ik are the positions (in the customer’s
preference order) of the T-shirts that the store puts on display, then the number of T-shirts he or
she buys is given by function:
fm,k(i1, . . . , ik) = α0.10m(i1) + α0.01m(i2).
Thus, to maximize its revenue, the store should find a winning committee for the election where the
T-shirts are the candidates, the voters are the customers, and where we use decomposable committee
scoring rule Rf based on f = (fm,k)k≤m.
We refer to decomposable rules defined through committee scoring functions of the form
fm,k(i1, . . . , ik) = λ
k
1αtm,k,1(i1) + · · ·+ λ
k
kαtm,k,k(ik),
where Λk = (λ
k
1 , . . . , λ
k
k) are OWA operators and tm,k,1, . . . , tm,k,k are sequences of integers from [m],
as multithreshold rules (we put no constraints on tm,k,1, . . . , tm,k,k; both increasing and decreasing
sequences are natural).
Proposition 3.6. The committee scoring rule defined through the multithreshold functions
fm,k(i1, . . . , ik) = αp1(i1) + αp2(i2), for p1, p2 ∈ {2, . . . ,m − k − 2}, p1 > p2 + 1 ≥ 3, is not
OWA-based.
Proof. Let us fix p1, p2, m, and k that satisfy the requirements from the statement of the theo-
rem. For the sake of contradiction, assume that our multithreshold function is OWA-based. By
Lemma 2.1 we infer that there exist a committee scoring function gm,k of the form:
gm,k(i1, . . . , ik) = λ1γ(i1) + λ2γ(i2),
where λ1, λ2 ∈ R are two numbers and γ is a single-winner scoring function, such that for each com-
mittee position I = (i1, . . . , ik) it holds that fm,k(I) = gm,k(I); this follows because, by Lemma 2.1,
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the OWA-based committee scoring functions for our rule have to depend on i1 and i2 only, and by
applying appropriate linear transformations, we can assume that these functions equal fm,k.
Let us now consider two committee positions I ′ = (p2, p1 +1, . . .) and I
′′ = (p2, p1, . . .). We see
that:
fm,k(I
′)− fm,k(I
′′) =
(
αp1(p2) + αp2(p1 + 1)
)
−
(
αp1(p2) + αp2(p1)
)
= αp2(p1 + 1)− αp2(p1) = 0,
and, thus, it must also be the case that:
gm,k(I
′)− gm,k(I
′′) =
(
λ1γ(p2) + λ2γ(p1 + 1)
)
−
(
λ1γ(p2) + λ2γ(p1)
)
= λ2
(
γ(p1 + 1)− γ(p1)
)
= 0
On the other hand, for committee positions J ′ = (p1 + 1, p1 + 2, . . .) and J
′′ = (p1, p1 + 2, . . .) we
have:
fm,k(J
′)− fm,k(J
′′) =
(
αp1(p1 + 1) + αp2(p1 + 2)
)
−
(
αp1(p1) + αp2(p1 + 2)
)
< 0
and, consequently:
gm,k(J
′)− gm,k(J
′′) =
(
λ1γ(p1 + 1) + λ2γ(p1 + 2)
)
−
(
λ1γ(p1) + λ2γ(p1 + 2)
)
= λ1
(
γ(p1 + 1)− γ(p1)
)
< 0.
Since we have both λ2
(
γ(p1 + 1) − γ(p1)
)
= 0 and λ1
(
γ(p1 + 1) − γ(p1)
)
< 0, we conclude that
λ2 = 0. However, for committee positions L
′ = (p2 − 1, p2 + 1, . . .) and L
′′ = (p2 − 1, p2, . . .) we
have:
fm,k(L
′)− fm,k(L
′′) =
(
αp1(p2 − 1) + αp2(p2 + 1)
)
−
(
αp1(p2 − 1) + αp2(p2)
)
< 0
and:
gm,k(L
′)− gm,k(L
′′) =
(
λ1γ(p2 − 1) + 0 · γ(p2 + 1)
)
−
(
λ1(p2 − 1) + 0 · (p2)
)
= 0,
which is a contradiction and completes the proof.
We generally expect decomposable rules to be NP-hard, but even among these rules there are
polynomial-time computable rules (that are not OWA-based). For example, in their discussion of
top-k-counting rules, Faliszewski et al. [31] mention a multithreshold rule that uses scoring functions
that mix SNTV and Perfectionist:
fSNTV+Perfm,k (i1, . . . , ik) = f
SNTV
m,k (i1, . . . , ik) + f
Perf
m,k (i1, . . . , ik) = α1(i1) + αk(ik).
Briefly put, each winning committee under this rule is either an SNTV winning committee or is
ranked on top k positions by some voter, and it suffices to check all such possibilities (thus, e.g., it
is possible to compute some winning committee in polynomial time). One can show that this rule
is not OWA-based using the same approach as in Proposition 3.6.
3.6 Beyond Decomposable Rules
Naturally, there are also committee scoring rules that go beyond the class of decomposable rules.
Below we provide two examples, starting with one inspired by our T-shirt store.
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Example 3.4. In this example, the store does not want to maximize its direct revenue (i.e., the
number of T-shirts sold), but the number of happy customers (in hope of increased future revenue).
Let us say that a customer is happy if he or she finds at least two “good enough” T-shirts or at least
one “great” T-shirt (recall that “at least good enough” shirts are among top 10% of all available
ones, and “great” shirts are among the top 1%). Then the store should use the committee scoring
function
fm,k(i1, . . . , ik) = max(α0.01m(i1), α0.10m(i2)).
We refer to multithreshold rules with summation replaced by the max operator as max-threshold
rules. Using an approach similar to that from Proposition 3.6, one can show that there are max-
threshold rules that are not decomposable (we omit details).
In their search for rules between k-Borda and β-CC, Faliszewski et al. [32] introduced the class
of ℓp-Borda rules, based on the following scoring functions (p ≥ 1 is a parameter):
f
ℓp-Borda
m,k (i1, . . . , ik) =
p
√
βpm(i1) + · · · + β
p
m(ik).
While the motivation for these rules is the same as for the q-HarmonicBorda rules, they behave
quite differently (see the work of Faliszewski et al. [32] for a detailed discussion).
Corollary 3.7. There are committee scoring rules that are not decomposable.
Throughout the rest of the paper, we will not venture outside the class of decomposable rules.
However, the above two examples show that there are interesting rules there that also deserve to
be studied carefully.
4 Axiomatic Properties of Committee Scoring Rules
After exploring the universe of committee scoring rules from a syntactic (structural) perspective,
we now consider axiomatic properties of the observed classes. Specifically, we will use two types
of monotonicity notions—non-crossing monotonicity (together with its relaxations) and committee
enlargement monotonicity—to characterize several of the classes and to gain insights regarding
some others. Indeed, various monotonicity concepts have long been used in social choice (with
Maskin monotonicity [53] being perhaps the most important example) and we follow this tradition.
4.1 Non-crossing Monotonicity and Its Relaxations
Elkind et al. [25] introduced two monotonicity notions for multiwinner rules, namely candidate
monotonicity (recall Section 2.3) and non-crossing monotonicity. In the former, we require that
if we shift forward a candidate from a winning committee in some vote, then this candidate still
belongs to some winning committee after the shift, but possibly to a different one. In the latter
monotonicity notion, we require that the whole committee remains winning, but we forbid shifts
were members of the winning committee pass each other (i.e., after a shift none of the committee
members gets worse and some get better). More formally, we have the following definition.
Definition 4.1 (Elkind et al. [25]). A multiwinner rule R is non-crossing monotone if for each
election E = (C, V ) and each k ∈ [|C|] the following holds: if c ∈ W for some W ∈ R(E, k), then
for each E′ obtained from E by shifting c forward by one position in some vote without passing
another member of W , we still have W ∈ R(E′, k).
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Elkind et al. [25] have shown that weakly separable rules are non-crossing monotone, and we
will now show that the converse is also true. However, before we proceed to the proof, we introduce
the following notation (that will also be useful in further analysis):
Consider an arbitrary number of candidates m and a size of committee k ∈ [m]. For each
t ∈ [k] and p ∈ [m], let Pm,k(t, p) be the set of committee positions from [m]k that have
their t-th element equal to p and such that they do not include position p − 1. We set
Pm,k(p) =
⋃
t≤k Pm,k(t, p).
For example, if m = 5 and k = 3, then P5,1(1, 4) = ∅, P5,3(2, 4) = {(1, 4, 5), (2, 4, 5)}, P5,3(3, 4) =
{(1, 2, 4)}, and P5,3(4) = P5,3(1, 4) ∪ P5,3(2, 4) ∪ P5,3(3, 4) = {(1, 4, 5), (2, 4, 5), (1, 2, 4)}.
Intuitively, Pm,k(t, p) is a collection of committee positions in which the t-th committee member
stands on position p and where shifting him or her without passing another committee member is
possible. Similarly, Pm,k(p) is a collection of committee positions in which there is some committee
member on position p and it is possible to shift him to position p − 1 without passing another
committee member.
Theorem 4.1. Let Rf be a committee scoring rule. Rf is non-crossing monotone if and only if it
is weakly separable.
Proof. Let Rf be a committee scoring rule defined through a family f = (fm,k)k≤m of scoring
functions fm,k : [m]k → R. Due to the results of Elkind et al. [25], it suffices to show that if Rf
is non-crossing monotone then it is weakly separable. So let us assume that Rf is non-crossing
monotone.
Let us fix the number of candidates m and the committee size k ∈ [m]. Let E = (C, V ) be an
election with candidate set C = {c1, . . . , cm} and collection of voters V = (v1, . . . , vm!), with one
voter for each possible preference order. By symmetry, every size-k subset W of C is a winning
committee under Rf .
Consider an arbitrary integer p ∈ {2, . . . ,m}, two arbitrary (but distinct) committee positions
I = (i1, . . . , ik) and J = (j1, . . . , jk) from Pm,k(p), and an arbitrary vote v from the election. Let
C(I) be the set of candidates that v ranks at positions i1, . . . , ik, and let C(J) be defined analogously
for the case of J . Let E′ be the election obtained by shifting in v the candidate currently in position
p one position up. Finally, let I ′ and J ′ be committee positions obtained from I and J by replacing
the number p with p− 1 (it is possible to do so as I and J are both from Pm,k(p)).
Since, by assumption, Rf is non-crossing monotone, it must be the case that C(I) and C(J)
are winning committees under Rf also in election E
′. The difference of the scores of committee
C(I) in elections E′ and E is fm,k(I
′)− fm,k(I), and the difference of the scores of committee C(J)
in E′ and E is fm,k(J
′)− fm,k(J). It must be the case that:
fm,k(I
′)− fm,k(I) = fm,k(J
′)− fm,k(J) ≥ 0.
However, since the choice of p and the choices of I and J within Pm,k(p) were completely arbitrary,
it must be the case that there is a function hm,k such that for each p ∈ {2, . . . ,m}, each sequence
U ∈ Pm,k(p), and each committee position U
′ obtained from U by replacing position p with p− 1,
we have:
hm,k(p − 1) = fm,k(U
′)− fm,k(U)
and the values of hm,k are non-negative.
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Our goal now is to construct a single-winner scoring function γm,k such that for each committee
position (ℓ1, . . . , ℓk) ∈ [m]k it holds that:
fm,k(ℓ1, . . . , ℓk) = γm,k(ℓ1) + γm,k(ℓ2) + · · ·+ γm,k(ℓk).
We define γm,k by requiring that (a) for each p ∈ {2, . . . ,m}, we have γm,k(p − 1) − γm,k(p) =
hm,k(p−1) (so γm,k is a non-increasing function), and (b) γm,k(m) is such that γm,k(m)+γm,k(m−
1)+ . . .+γm,k(m−(k−1)) = fm,k(m−(k−1), . . . ,m−1,m) (so that γm,k indeed correctly describes
the fm,k-score of the committee ranked at the k bottom positions as a sum of the scores of the
candidates).
We fix some committee position (ℓ1, . . . , ℓk) from [m]k. We know that, due to the choice of
γm,k(m), for R = (r1, . . . , rk) = (m− k + 1, . . . ,m) it does hold that fm,k(r1, . . . , rk) = γm,k(r1) +
· · ·+γm,k(rk). Now we can see that this property also holds for R
′ = (r1−1, r2, . . . , rk). The reason
is that
γm,k(m− k)− γm,k(m− k + 1) = hm,k(m− k) = fm,k(R
′)− fm,k(R).
Thus, for R′, we have fm,k(R
′) = γm,k(r1 − 1) + γm,k(r2) + · · · + γm,k(rk). We can proceed in
this way, shifting the top member of the committee up by sufficiently many positions, to obtain
R′′ = (ℓ1, r2, . . . , rk) and (by the same argument as above) have:
fm,k(R
′′) = γm,k(ℓ1) + γm,k(r2) + · · ·+ γm,k(rk).
Then we can do the same to position r2, and keep decreasing it until we get ℓ2. Then the same for
the third position, and so on, until the k-th position. Finally, we get:
fm,k(ℓ1, . . . , ℓk) = γm,k(ℓ1) + · · ·+ γm,k(ℓk).
This proves our claim and completes the proof.
Non-crossing monotonicity is particularly natural when we seek committees of individually
excellent candidates (for example, when we seek finalists of a competition or where we are interested
in some shortlisting tasks [25, 33]). Indeed, if we have a committeeW where we view each member as
good enough to be selected, and one of the members ofW improves its performance without hurting
the performance of any of the others, then it is perfectly natural to expect that all members of W
are still good enough to be selected. Theorem 4.1 justifies axiomatically that if we are looking for
a committee scoring rule for selecting individually excellent candidates then we should look within
the class of weakly separable rules. In fact, Elkind et al. [25] pointed out that we should focus on
separable rules only, and we will provide axiomatic justification for this view in Section 4.2.
4.1.1 Prefix Monotonicity and Decomposable Rules
Based on the idea of non-crossing monotonicity, we can define other similar notions. In this section
we introduce and discuss one of them, which we call prefix monotonicity. Intuitively, if a rule satisfies
the prefix monotonicity condition, then shifting forward a group of highest-ranked members of a
winning committee within a given vote never prevents this committee from winning.
Definition 4.2. A multiwinner rule R satisfies t-prefix monotonicity, 0 ≤ t ≤ k, if for each election
E = (C, V ) and each committee size k, t ≤ k ≤ |C| the following holds: For every W ∈ R(E, k),
and every E′ obtained from E by shifting in some vote the top-ranked t members of W (according
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Figure 2: An example showing how the sequences of positions I, I ′ and I1 from the proof of
Lemma 4.2 are related.
to this vote), then we have that W ∈ R(E′, k). We say that R satisfies prefix monotonicity if it
satisfies t-prefix monotonicity for every t ∈ N.8
Prefix monotonicity is a relaxation of non-crossing monotonicity and, in consequence, all weakly
separable rules satisfy it. In the remaining part of this section we will show that only decomposable
rules can be prefix-monotone (and mostly, though not only, those based on convex functions; we
will explain this in the further part of this section). Before we prove this statement, let us first
prove one more technical lemma, which will allow us to reuse some of the reasoning later on. The
lemma uses the same high-level idea as the first part of the proof of Theorem 4.1, yet it is more
involved and differs in a number of details. (Recall that Pm,k(t, p) used in the statement of the
lemma was defined right before Theorem 4.1.)
Lemma 4.2. Let Rf be a committee scoring rule and let t be an integer such that for each x ∈ [t]
this rule is x-prefix monotone. Then, for every number of candidates m and size of the committee k,
there exists a function ht such that for each p ∈ [m], each U ∈ Pm,k(t, p), with p ≥ t, and committee
position U ′ obtained from U by replacing position p with p− 1, we have:
ht(p − 1) = f(U
′)− f(U) ≥ 0.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary integer p ∈ [m] and two arbitrary (but distinct) committee positions
I = (i1, . . . , ik) and J = (j1, . . . , jk) from Pm,k(t, p), such that I and J have the first t elements
equal. Let I ′ and J ′ be the committee positions obtained from I and J , respectively, by replacing
the element p with p − 1 (by the choice of I and J , it is possible to do so). Let I1 and J1 be the
committee positions obtained from I and J , respectively, by increasing every element with value
lower than p by one (in particular, when t = 1 we have I1 = I and J1 = J). The way the sequences
I ′ and I1 are constructed from I is depicted in Figure 2 (in this example t = 4) and is presented
below, also for J ′ and J1 (it = p, it−1 ≤ p− 2, j1 = i1, . . . , jt = it):
I = (i1, i2 . . . , it−1, p, ii+1, . . . , ik), J = (i1, i2 . . . , it−1, p, ji+1, . . . , jk),
I ′ = (i1, i2 . . . , it−1, p− 1, ii+1, . . . , ik), J
′ = (i1, i2 . . . , it−1, p− 1, ji+1, . . . , jk),
I1 = (i1 + 1, i2 + 1 . . . , it−1 + 1, p, ii+1, . . . , ik), J1 = (i1 + 1, i2 + 1 . . . , it−1 + 1, p, ji+1, . . . , jk).
As in the proof of Theorem 4.1, we construct an election E = (C, V ) with candidate set
C = {c1, . . . , cm} and m! voters v1, . . . , vm!, one for each possible preference order. By symmetry,
every size-k subset W of C is a winning committee of E under Rf . Further, consider an arbitrary
8Note that 0-prefix monotonicity is an empty concept; as such, every rule satisfies it.
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vote v from the election; let C(I1) and C(J1) be the committees that v ranks on positions I1 and
J1, respectively. As all other committees, C(I1) and C(J1) are winning in E. Let us shift in v by
one position forward each candidate from C(I1) that stands on a position with value lower than
p. After such an operation, committee C(I1) will have position I and committee C(I1) will have
position J . Since, by assumption, Rf is (t− 1)-prefix-monotone, and exactly t− 1 candidates have
changed positions, it must be the case that C(I1) and C(J1) are still winning under Rf . It must
be the case that:
f(I)− f(I1) = f(J)− f(J1) ≥ 0.
By a similar reasoning, using the fact that Rf is t-prefix-monotone, we also conclude that:
f(I ′)− f(I1) = f(J
′)− f(J1) ≥ 0.
From the two above equalities we get that (the final inequality follows because J ′ dominates J):
f(I ′)− f(I) = f(J ′)− f(J) ≥ 0. (1)
Recall that in the above equality I and J have the first t − 1 elements equal. We would like
to obtain the same relation even if the prefixes of I and J differ. Thus, now we will show how to
change one element in the prefix of I and I ′ to an element different by one, so that the equality
still holds. By repeating this operation sufficiently many times, we can conclude that the equality
does not depend on the prefix of I. For the sake of concreteness, we will show how to change it−1
to it−1 + 1 in the prefix of I (this assumes that it−1 + 1 < p − 1). A change of any other element
in the prefix can be performed analogously. We proceed as follows. Let us define:
Inew = (i1, i2 . . . , it−1 + 1, p, ii+1, . . . , ik), Lnew = (i1, i2 . . . , it−1 + 1, p − 1, ii+1, . . . , ik),
I ′new = (i1, i2 . . . , it−1, p, ii+1, . . . , ik), L
′
new = (i1, i2 . . . , it−1, p − 1, ii+1, . . . , ik).
In particular, observe that I ′new = I and that L
′
new = I
′. Similarly as before, by using (t−1)-prefix-
monotonicity and (t− 2)-prefix-monotonicity, we obtain that:
f(I ′new)− f(Inew) = f(L
′
new)− f(Lnew) ≥ 0. (2)
Adding inequalities (1) and (2), we get:
f(I ′)− f(I) + f(I ′new)− f(Inew) = f(J
′)− f(J) + f(L′new)− f(Lnew).
which is equivalent to:
f(Lnew)− f(Inew) = f(J
′)− f(J).
However, we can see that Lnew and Inew are simply I
′ and I where one element of the prefix,
it−1, is replaced with it−1 + 1. By our previous discussion, it follows that we can prove that
f(I ′)− f(I) = f(J ′)− f(J) even if I and J have different prefixes.
Since the choice of p, I, and J (within Pm,k(t, p)) is completely arbitrary, it must be the case
that for each t there exists a function ht such that for each p ∈ {t + 1, . . . ,m}, each sequence
U ∈ Pm,k(t, p), and each sequence U
′ obtained from U by replacing position p with p− 1, we have:
ht(p− 1) = f(U
′)− f(U) ≥ 0.
The final inequality follows from equation (1).
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We are ready to show that only decomposable rules can satisfy prefix-monotonicity.
Theorem 4.3. Let Rf be a committee scoring rule. If Rf is prefix-monotone then it must be
decomposable.
Proof. Let f = (fm,k)k≤m be a family of committee scoring functions such that Rf is prefix-
monotone. Let us fix the number of candidates m and the committee size k. For each t ∈ [k], let
ht be the function constructed in Lemma 4.2.
Our goal is to provide single-winner scoring functions γ
(1)
m,k, . . . , γ
(k)
m,k such that for each commit-
tee position (ℓ1, . . . , ℓk) we have:
fm,k(ℓ1, . . . , ℓk) = γ
(1)
m,k(ℓ1) + γ
(2)
m,k(ℓ2) + · · ·+ γ
(k)
m,k(ℓk). (3)
To this end, for each t ∈ [k], we define γ
(t)
m,k : {t, . . . ,m− k + t} → R so that:
9
1. The values γk(m), γk−1(m−1), . . . , γ1(m−(k−1)) are such that f(m−(k−1), . . . ,m−1,m) =
γk(m)+γk−1(m−1)+ . . .+γ1(m− (k−1)) (so equation (3) holds for the committee position
where the candidates are ranked at the k bottom positions).
2. For each p ∈ {t+1, . . . ,m−k+ t}, we have γ
(t)
m,k(p−1)−γ
(t)
m,k(p) = ht(p−1). (By Lemma 4.2,
we have ht(p− 1) ≥ 0, so γ
(t)
m,k is nonincreasing.)
There may be many different ways to define functions γ
(1)
m,k, . . . , γ
(k)
m,k satisfying the above conditions
and we choose one of them arbitrarily.
To show that equation (3) holds, we use the same approach as in the second part of the proof
of Theorem 4.1. Specifically, we note that if equation (3) holds for some committee position
R = (r1, . . . , rk) and R
′ = (r1, . . . , rt− 1, . . . , rk) also is a valid committee position for some t ∈ [k],
then (by definition of ht) we have:
fm,k(R
′) = fm,k(R) + ht(rt − 1)
= γ
(1)
m,k(r1) + · · ·+ γ
(t−1)
m,k (rt−1) +
(
γ
(t)
m,k(rt) + ht(rt − 1)
)
+ γ
(t+1)
m,k (rt+1) + · · ·+ γ
(k)
m,k(rk)
= γ
(1)
m,k(r1) + · · ·+ γ
(t−1)
m,k (rt−1) + γ
(t)
m,k(rt − 1) + γ
(t+1)
m,k (rt+1) + · · ·+ γ
(k)
m,k(rk).
Since equation (3) holds for committee position (m− (k−1), . . . ,m), applying the above argument
inductively proves that equation (3) holds for all committee positions.
Theorem 4.3 states that decomposability is a necessary condition for a committee scoring rule
to be prefix-monotone. However, as the following example shows, it is not sufficient.
Example 4.1. The k-Approval Chamberlin–Courant rule (αk-CC), defined by committee scoring
functions fαk-CCm,k (i1, . . . , ik) = αk(i1), is a decomposable rule that is not prefix-monotone. Indeed,
consider k = 2 and an election with four candidates {a, b, c, d} that includes one vote for each
possible ranking of these four candidates. This election contains 4! = 24 votes and, in particular,
vote v : a ≻ b ≻ c ≻ d. By the symmetry of the rule we see that for such election each committee
is winning, including W = {b, c} and W ′ = {c, d}. If αk-CC were prefix-monotone, then shifting b
and c by one position forward in v (to obtain b ≻ c ≻ a ≻ d) should keep W winning. Doing so,
however, does not change the score of W and increases the score of W ′, so W no longer wins. This
shows that αk-CC is not prefix-monotone.
9Formally, γt must be defined on [m] but it actually never has a chance to calculate values γt(s), where s < t or
s > m− k + t, so these values of γt can be chosen arbitrarily.
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candidates that have been moved both in W and in W ′
Figure 3: Illustration of the notation used in Proposition 4.4.
On the other hand, if we assume that the single-winner scoring functions underlying a decom-
posable rule are, in a certain sense, convex, then we obtain a sufficient condition for this rule to be
prefix-monotone.
Proposition 4.4. Let Rf be a decomposable committee scoring rule defined through a family of
scoring functions fm,k(i1, . . . , ik) = γ
(1)
m,k(i1) + γ
(2)
m,k(i2) + · · · + γ
(k)
m,k(ik), where γ = (γ
(t)
m,k)t≤k≤m is
a family of single-winner scoring functions. A sufficient condition for Rf to be prefix-monotone is
that for each m and each k ∈ [m] we have that:
(i) for each i ∈ [k] and each p, p′ ∈ [m− 1], p < p′, it holds that:
γ(i)(p)− γ(i)(p + 1) ≥ γ(i)(p′)− γ(i)(p′ + 1), and (4)
(ii) for each i, j ∈ [k], j > i, and each p ∈ [m], j ≤ p < m− (k − i), it holds that
γ(i)(p)− γ(i)(p+ 1) ≥ γ(j)(p)− γ(j)(p+ 1). (5)
Intuitively, condition (i) says that the functions in the family γ are convex, and condition (ii)
says that, for each m and k, if i < j then γ
(i)
m,k decreases not faster than γ
(j)
m,k.
Proof. Let Rf be defined as in the statement of the proposition and fix the number of candidates
m and the committee size k. Consider an election E where a committee W is a winner. Let j be
a number from [k] and let E′ be an election obtained from E by shifting forward by one position
each of the first j members of W in some vote v. We will show that W is a winning committee
in E′. Let (ℓ1, . . . , ℓk) be the committee position of W in v (in election E). In comparison with E,
in E′ the score of W is increased by:
j∑
t=1
(
γt(ℓt − 1)− γt(ℓt)
)
.
Let us now assess by how much the score of some other committee, W ′, can increase. Let us fix
t ∈ [j], and let ct be the candidate standing at position ℓt in v (in particular, ct ∈ W ). If ct /∈ W
′,
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then shifting ct one position up has no positive effect on the score of W
′. Consider the case when
ct ∈ W
′. Let xt denote the position of ct within W
′ according to v (for instance, if ct is the most
preferred among members of W ′ in v, then xt = 1). This notation is illustrated in Figure 3. Now,
we consider two cases:
Case 1 (xt ≥ t). The condition (5) implies that:
γxt(ℓt − 1)− γxt(ℓt) ≤ γt(ℓt − 1)− γt(ℓt).
Thus the increase of the score of W ′ due to shifting ct one position up is not greater than
the increase of the score of W due to shifting ct one position up. We assign ct in W to ct in
W ′; this assignment is shown with a bold dashed arrow in Figure 3) and, intuitively, it means
that the increase of the score of W due to shifting ct “compensates for” the increase of the
score of W ′ due to shifting the assigned candidate.
Case 2 (xt < t). Now, we observe that due to (4) we have:
γxt(ℓt − 1)− γxt(ℓt) ≤ γxt(ℓxt − 1)− γxt(ℓxt).
Thus the increase of the score of W ′ due to shifting ct one position up is not greater than
the increase of the score of W due to shifting the candidate at position ℓxt < ℓt, call such a
candidate c, one position up. We assign ct in W
′ to c in W ; this assignment is depicted with
a solid arrow in Figure 3.
From the above reasoning we see that for each t ∈ [j] the increase of the score of W ′ due to
shifting ct one position up is no greater than the increase of the score of W due to shifting some
other candidate cr (r ≤ t) one position up; in such case we say that cr is assigned to ct and that
cr compensates for ct. Further, we note that each candidate ct ∈ W
′ is assigned to a different
“compensating” candidate (see Figure 3 and consider how the assignment is defined, starting from
the highest values of t and decreasing t one by one). We conclude that the score of W ′ increases
in E′ by a value that is not greater than the increase of the score of W . Since W ′ was chosen
arbitrarily, we get that W is a winner in E′, which completes the proof.
As far as applications of multiwinner voting goes, prefix monotonicity does not seem to have
as clear-cut interpretation as non-crossing monotonicity. Nonetheless, in the next section we will
see how its relaxed variant is useful in characterizing representation-focused rules (and how this
characterization can be interpreted in the context of diversity-oriented committee elections).
4.1.2 Top-Member Monotonicity and Representation-Focused Rules
Our goal in this section is to provide an axiomatic characterization of representation-focused rules.
The first tool that we employ for this task is 1-prefix monotonicity (recall Definition 4.2), which
we rename as top-member monotonicity. Intuitively, top-member monotonicity requires that if in
some vote v we shift forward the highest-ranked member of a given winning committee, then this
committee remains as a winning one. Since top-member monotonicity is a relaxed variant of non-
crossing monotonicity (and of prefix monotonicity), it is satisfied by all weakly separable rules and
alone is insufficient to characterize representation-focused rules. Thus we will also use the notion
of narrow-top consistency, defined below (which, in fact, is a relaxed form of the solid coalitions
property of Elkind et al. [25], itself motivated by a much stronger notion of Dummet [23]).
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Definition 4.3. A multiwinner rule R satisfies narrow-top consistency if for each election E =
(C, V ) and each k ∈ [|C|] the following holds: If there exists a set of at most k candidates S, such
that each voter in V ranks some candidate from S first and each member of S is ranked first by
some voter, then for each W ∈ R(E, k) it holds that S ⊆W .
Together, top-member monotonicity and narrow-top consistency exactly characterize the class
of representation-focused rules (within the class of committee scoring rules). We prove this result
formally below, and then we explain the roles of both our axioms intuitively.
Theorem 4.5. Let Rf be a committee scoring rule. Rf is representation-focused if and only if it
satisfies top-member monotonicity and narrow-top consistency.
Proof. It is apparent that each representation-focused rule satisfies both top-member monotonicity
and narrow-top consistency. Suppose that Rf is a committee scoring rule, defined through a family
f = (fm,k)k≤m of scoring functions fm,k : [m]k → R+, that satisfies these two properties. We will
show that Rf is representation-focused.
Let us fix the number of candidates m and the committee size k. Since Rf satisfies 1-prefix
monotonicity (top-member monotonicity), by Lemma 4.2 we have that there exists a function h
such that for each p ∈ [m], each U ∈ Pm,k(1, p) and the committee position U
′, obtained from U
by replacing position p with p− 1, we have h(p − 1) = f(U ′)− f(U) ≥ 0.
Let I = (i1, . . . , ik) and J = (j1, . . . , jk) be such that i1 = j1. We will show that fm,k(I) =
fm,k(J), which is sufficient to prove thatRf is representation focused. For the sake of contradiction,
let us assume that this is not the case, and without loss of generality, let us assume that fm,k(I) >
fm,k(J). There exists a positive integer η such that ηfm,k(I) > ηfm,k(J) + kfm,k(1, . . . , k).
Let us fix a vote v and let W and W ′ denote the committees that stand in v on positions I and
J , respectively. Note that they have a common member d who stands on position i1 = j1 and is
highest ranked by v in both committees. Consider an election E with η copies of vote v and with
k votes such that for each candidate c ∈W ′ there is one vote who ranks c first and the remaining
candidates in some fixed, arbitrary way. In this election the score of W is at least equal to ηf(I)
and the score of W ′ is at most equal to ηf(J)+kf(1, . . . k). Thus the score of W is higher than the
score of W ′. If i1 = j1 = 1 we get a contradiction immediately since by the narrow-top consistency
W ′ must be winning.
If i1 = j1 6= 1, we construct election E
′ by shifting, in each copy of v, the candidate d ∈W ∩W ′
to the top position. In comparison to E, the scores of committees W and W ′ in E′ increase by the
same value η
(
h(1) − h(i1)
)
. As a result, W has a higher score than W ′ also in E′. This, however,
contradicts narrow-top consistency, since all top positions in this profile are occupied by candidates
from W ′. This proves that f(I) = f(J), and completes the reasoning.
Let us now explain intuitively the interplay between top-member monotonicity and narrow-top
consistency in the characterization of representation-focused rules. If we applied similar reasoning
as we used in the proofs of Theorems 4.1 and 4.3 to top-member monotonicity, then we could show
that if a committee scoring rule Rf is top-member monotone then its scoring functions are of the
form:
fm,k(i1, . . . , ik) = γm,k(i1) + gm,k−1(i2, . . . , ik), (6)
where γ = (γm,k)k≤m is a family of single-winner scoring functions and g = (gm,k−1)k−1≤m is a
family of committee scoring functions. Requiring that Rf is also narrow-top consistent ensures that
the functions gm,k are, in fact, constant, and in consequence gives that Rf is representation-focused.
Since all decomposable committee scoring rules are already of the form presented in equation (6)
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(and, in fact, they are of a far more restricted form), we have the following corollary (the proof
follows directly from the preceding reasoning, but straightforward calculations also show it directly;
we omit these details).
Corollary 4.6. If a decomposable committee scoring rule is narrow-top consistent then it is rep-
resentation focused.
Representation-focused rules generally, and the Chamberlin Courant rule specifically, are often
considered in the context of selecting diverse committees [25, 33]. While there is no clear definition
of what a “diverse committee” is, researchers often use this term intuitively, to mean that as many
voters as possible can find a committee member that they rank highly (if a voter v ranks some
committee member c highly, then we could say that c “covers” the views of v, so some authors
speak of “diversity/coverage”; see the works of Ratliff and Saari [68], Bredereck et al. [11], Celis et
al. [16], and Izsak et al. [43] for a different view regarding diverse committees). Theorem 4.5 justifies
the use of representation-focused rules to seek committees that are diverse in this sense. Indeed,
if there is a committee such that every voter ranks one of its members on top, then certainly this
committee “covers” the “diverse” views of all the voters; narrow-top consistency ensures that this
committee is selected. On the other hand, if there is a committee W and we agree that it “covers”
the views of sufficiently many voters, then if some voter ranks his or her highest-ranked committee
member even higher (i.e., this voter realizes that the candidate represents his or her views even
better), then certainly we should still view W as “covering” the views of sufficiently many voters;
this is ensured by top-member monotonicity.
4.2 Committee Enlargement Monotonicity and Separable Rules
In this section we consider the committee enlargement monotonicity axiom. While it is markedly
different from the notions that we used in the previous sections, it still has a clear monotonicity
flavor: Informally speaking, it requires that if W is a size-k winning committee for some election,
then there also is a size-(k + 1) winning committee for this election that includes all the members
of W (the actual definition is more complicated due to possible ties; its exact form is due to Elkind
et al. [25], but it was already studied by Barbera` and Coelho [7] for resolute multiwinner rules, and
in the literature on apportionment rules it is well known as house monotonicity [66, 6]).
Definition 4.4 (Elkind et al. [25]). A multiwinner election rule R satisfies committee monotonicity
if for each m and k, 1 ≤ k < m, and for each election E the following two conditions hold:
(1) for each W ∈ R(E, k) there exists W ′ ∈ R(E, k + 1) such that W ⊆W ′;
(2) for each W ∈ R(E, k + 1) there exists W ′ ∈ R(E, k) such that W ′ ⊆W .
This section is almost completely dedicated to showing that in the class of committee scoring
rules, committee enlargement monotonicity characterizes exactly the class of separable rules.
Theorem 4.7. Let Rf be a committee scoring rule. Rf is committee-enlargement monotone if and
only if Rf is separable.
Before we provide the proof of Theorem 4.7, we first introduce useful notation and tools. Given
two elections E1 = (C, V1) and E2 = (C, V2), by E1 + E2 we mean election (C, V1 + V2), whose
voter collection is obtained by concatenating the voter collections of E1 and E2. For an election
E = (C, V ) and a positive integer λ, by λE we mean election (C, λV ), whose voter collection
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consists of λ concatenated copies of V . We will heavily rely on the properties of the following
elections (let C be some set of m candidates; this set will always be clear from the context when
we use the notation introduced below):
1. For each candidate c ∈ C, by ζ(c) we denote the election with (m − 1)! voters who all rank
c as their most preferred candidate, followed by each possible permutation of the remaining
m− 1 candidates.
2. For each subset S ⊆ C, we define election ζ(S) to be
∑
c∈S ζ(c) (i.e., it is a concatenation of
the elections ζ(c) for each c ∈ S).
The next two lemmas describe which committees win in elections ζ(c) and ζ(S).
Lemma 4.8. Fix m and k, and consider a non-degenerate committee scoring rule R defined through
a scoring function fm,k. The set of winners for ζ(c) consists of all committees that contain c.
Proof. Since R is non-degenerate, there exists i such that fm,k(i+1, . . . , i+k) > fm,k(i+2, . . . , i+
k + 1). By the fact that election ζ(c) is symmetric with respect to all the candidates except c,
we see that all committees that contain c have the same fm,k-score. Similarly, all committees that
do not contain c also have the same score. Consider a committee W such that c /∈ W . Let c′ be
an arbitrary member of W and let W ′ = (W \ {c′}) ∪ {c}. Naturally, in each vote the position
of committee W ′ dominates that of W . Further, there exists a vote where W has committee
position (i+2, . . . , i+ k+1), and W ′ has position (1, i+2, . . . , i+ k). From this vote W gets score
fm,k(i + 2, . . . , i + k + 1) and W
′ gets score fm,k(1, i + 2, . . . , i + k) > fm,k(i+ 1, . . . , i + k). Thus
the score of W ′ in ζ(c) is higher than that of W . This completes the proof.
Lemma 4.9. Fix m, k, and S ⊆ C, and consider a non-degenerate committee scoring rule R
defined through a scoring function fm,k. If |S| ≥ k then the set of winning committees of ζ(S)
consists of all the committees W such that W ⊆ S. Otherwise, it consists of all the committees W
such that S ⊆W .
Proof. Consider election ζ(c) and let x and y denote the scores of committees, respectively, con-
taining c and not containing c. From Lemma 4.8 it follows that x > y. Consider the case when
|S| ≥ k (the proof for the other case follows by analogous reasoning). The score of a committee W
such that W ⊆ S is equal to kx+ (|S| − k)y. For each committee W ′ with W ′ 6⊆ S, its score is at
most equal to (k − 1)x+ (|S| − k + 1)y < kx+ (|S| − k)y.
In the following observation we analyze the scores of candidates and committees in the elections
we will be using in the proof of Theorem 4.7.
Observation 1. Consider two committees, W1 and W2, with W1 \W2 = {c1} and W2 \W1 = {c2}.
By symmetry of our construction, for each single-winner scoring function fm,1, the fm,1-scores of
the candidates c1 and c2 are the same in election ζ(W1∪W2), are the same in election ζ(W1∩W2),
and are the same in election ζ
(
{c1, c2}
)
. Further, in each of these three elections, the fm,1-scores of
any two candidates c, c′ ∈W1∩W2 are equal. If fm,1 is nontrivial, then in ζ(W1∪W2), ζ(W1∩W2)
and ζ
(
{c1, c2}
)
the fm,1-scores of candidates c1 and c2 are, respectively, the same, lower, and higher
than the fm,1-score of any other candidate c ∈W1 ∪W2. Also, for each committee scoring function
fm,k, the fm,k-scores of committees W1 and W2 are the same in ζ(W1 ∪ W2), are the same in
ζ(W1∩W2), and are the same in ζ
(
{c1, c2}
)
. In ζ
(
W1∩W2 \{c}
)
, where c 6= c1, c2, the fm,k-scores
of W1 and W2 are equal, and the fm,1-score of c is lower than the fm,1-score of any other candidate
from W1 ∩W2.
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In the next lemma we handle the possibility that the rule Rf in Theorem 4.7 may be trivial.
(Note that it is not the case that if a committee-enlargement monotone multiwinner rule always
outputs all size-1 committees then it also always outputs all size-k committees for larger values
of k. The result below excludes this behavior for the subclass of committee scoring rules.)
Lemma 4.10. Suppose that Rf is a committee scoring rule defined by a family f = (fm,k)k≤m of
scoring functions, such that Rf is committee-enlargement monotone and fm,1 is constant. Then
fm,k is constant for every k ≤ m.
Proof. Rf is trivial for k = 1 and we will show that, in fact, it is trivial for all k. The proof
follows by induction. Let us assume that Rf is trivial for some k = p − 1, i.e., that fm,p−1 is
constant. For the sake of contradiction let us assume that fm,p is not trivial, hence fm,p(1, . . . , p) >
fm,p(m − p + 1, . . . m). Let i be the smallest positive integer such that fm,p(i + 1, . . . , i + p) >
fm,p(i + 2, . . . i + p + 1). Consider an election where a certain candidate c is always in position
i + p + 1, the positions i + p + 2, . . . ,m are also always occupied by the same candidates, and on
positions 1, . . . , i+ p there are always the same candidates, call the set of these candidates S, but
in all possible permutations. We can see that the fm,p-scores of committees that consists only of
candidates from S are higher than the fm,p-scores of committees that contain c (the reasoning is
very similar to the one given in the proof of Lemma 4.8). This, however, contradicts committee
monotonicity, since by our inductive assumption, for k = p − 1 all committees were winning, and
so for k = p there should be at least one winning committee containing c.
We are nearly ready to present the proof of Theorem 4.7. The final piece of notation that we
will need is as follows. Given two committee positions I = (i1, . . . , ik) and J = (j1, . . . , jk), we
will sometimes treat them as sets rather than sequences. For example, by |I ∩ J | we will mean the
number of single-candidate positions that occur within both I and J , and we will say that i ∈ I if
there is some t such that i = it.
Proof of Theorem 4.7. Each separable committee scoring rule is committee-enlargement monotone
and we focus on proving the converse.
Let Rf be the committee-enlargement monotone committee scoring rule defined through a
family f = (fm,k)k≤m of scoring functions. Let us fix the number of candidates in our elections to
be m. Rf assigns a score to each committee of each size and, in particular, for k = 1, given an
election E = (C, V ) it assigns fm,1-score to each candidate (singleton):
fm,1-scoreE(c) =
∑
vi∈V
fm,1(posvi(c)),
We will show by induction on k that for each election E, a size-k committee W is winning under
Rf if and only if it consists of candidates with the k highest fm,1-scores.
The base for the induction, for k = 1, follows immediately from the definition of Rf . Now, to
prove the inductive step, let us assume that for each k < p and for each election E it holds that
W ∈ Rf (E, k) if and only if it consists of k candidates with the highest fm,1-scores. We will show
that this is also the case for k = p. By Lemma 4.10 we may assume that Rf for k = 1 is nontrivial.
Our first task is to show that whenever:
fm,p(1, . . . , p) = fm,p(i+ 1, . . . , i+ p) (7)
for some i ∈ [m], then fm,1(1) = · · · = fm,1(i + p). For the sake of contradiction let us assume
that fm,p(1, . . . , p) = fm,p(i + 1, . . . , i + p) and fm,1(1) > fm,1(i + p). We first show that it must
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hold that fm,1(1) = · · · = fm,1(i + p − 1). To see why this is the case, consider an election with
a single vote c1 ≻ c2 ≻ · · · ≻ cm. In such an election, committee {c1, . . . , cp} always wins and,
since fm,p(1, . . . , p) = fm,p(i + 1, . . . , i + p), we have that committee Wi = {ci+1, . . . , ci+p} also
wins. By committee-enlargement monotonicity we know that some size-(p − 1) subcommittee of
Wi wins for committee size p − 1 and, in particular, by weak dominance we get that certainly
W ′i = {ci+1, . . . , ci+p−1} wins. Thus, by the inductive hypothesis it must be the case that:
fm,1(1) + . . .+ fm,1(p− 1) = fm,1(i+ 1) + . . .+ fm,1(i+ p− 1)
which implies that fm,1(1) = fm,1(i+p−1) and, thus, that fm,1(1) = fm,1(2) = · · · = fm,1(i+p−1).
Since we assumed that fm,1(1) > fm,1(i+ p), it must be the case that fm,1(i+ p− 1) > fm,1(i+ p).
Now we show that the assumption that fm,1(i+p−1) > fm,1(i+p) also leads to a contradiction.
Consider an election E with two votes:
v1 : c1 ≻ c2 ≻ . . . ≻ ci+p−1 ≻ ci+p ≻ . . . ≻ cm,
v2 : c1 ≻ c2 ≻ . . . ≻ ci+p ≻ ci+p−1 ≻ . . . ≻ cm,
which differ only in the order of ci+p−1 and ci+p. For each j < i+ p− 1, we have fm,1-scoreE(cj) =
2fm,1(j) and this value is higher than the fm,1-scores of ci+p−1 and ci+p. By the inductive hypoth-
esis, this means that for k = p − 1 there is no winning committee that contains either ci+p−1 or
ci+p. Thus, by committee-enlargement monotonicity, we infer that no winning committee for k = p
contains both ci+p−1 and ci+p. On the other hand, for k = p due to (7) the fm,p-score of committee
{ci+1, . . . , ci+p−1, ci+p} is the highest among committees of size p, which gives a contradiction.
Next, let i be the smallest value such that fm,p(i + 1, . . . , i + p) > fm,p(i + 2, . . . , i + p + 1).
We will show that fm,1(i + p) > fm,1(i + p + 1). Again, for the sake of contradiction, let us
assume that this is not the case and fm,1(i + p) = fm,1(i + p + 1). By our previous reasoning
we have that fm,1(1) = · · · = fm,1(i + p). Consider an election where a fixed candidate c stands
on position i + p + 1 and some set of i + p candidates stands on the first i + p positions in all
possible permutations. In such an election there is no winning committee of size p that contains c.
However, by the inductive hypothesis, a winning committee of size p − 1 containing c does exist.
This contradicts committee-enlargement monotonicity.
By the above reasoning, we can find two committee positions I∗ and J∗, for committees of size
p, such that |I∗ ∩ J∗| = p − 1, fm,p(I
∗) > fm,p(J
∗), and
∑
i∈I∗ fm,1(i) >
∑
i∈J∗ fm,1(i). Let us
arrange all committee positions from [m]k in a sequence S so that for each two consecutive elements
I and J in S it holds that |I ∩ J | = p− 1. This is possible (see the construction based on Johnson
graphs in Lemma 8 of the work of Skowron et al. [76]). We claim that for each two consecutive
elements of sequence S, call them I and J , it holds that:
fm,p(I)− fm,p(J)
fm,p(I∗)− fm,p(J∗)
=
∑
i∈I fm,1(i)−
∑
i∈J fm,1(i)∑
i∈I∗ fm,1(i)−
∑
i∈J∗ fm,1(i)
. (8)
(Note that the above expression is well defined. There is no division by zero because we selected
I∗ and J∗ so that fm,p(I
∗) 6= fm,p(J
∗) and
∑
i∈I∗ fm,1(i) 6=
∑
i∈J∗ fm,1(i).) For the sake of con-
tradiction, let us assume that equality (8) does not hold for some I and J , and let us assume that
there exist x, y ∈ N such that:
fm,p(I)− fm,p(J)
fm,p(I∗)− fm,p(J∗)
>
x
y
>
∑
i∈I fm,1(i)−
∑
i∈J fm,1(i)∑
i∈I∗ fm,1(i)−
∑
i∈J∗ fm,1(i)
(9)
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Let W1 and W2 be two fixed committees with |W1 ∩ W2| = p − 1. Let W1 \ W2 = {c1} and
W2 \W1 = {c2}. We construct election Q in which there are x votes where W1 stands on position
I∗ and W2 on position J
∗, and y votes where W1 stands on position J and W2 on position I. In Q
the score ofW2 is equal to xfm,p(J
∗)+yfm,p(I), and the score ofW1 is equal to xfm,p(I
∗)+yfm,p(J).
By inequality (9), we see that the fm,p-score ofW2 in Q is greater than the fm,p-score ofW1, yet the
sum of the fm,1-scores of members ofW2 is lower than that of the members ofW1, which means that
the fm,1-score of c1 in Q is greater than the fm,1-score of c2 (these are the only candidates in which
the two committees differ). If inequality (9) were reversed (i.e., if we replaced both occurrences of
“>” with “<”) then the same construction would still work but we would have to reverse the roles
of W1 and W2 and of c1 and c2.
We construct election Qs by taking each possible permutation σ of the candidates fromW1∩W2
and by concatenating all elections of the form σ(Q) (where σ(Q) is an election that results from
applying σ to the candidates in all the preference orders within Q). Thus, intuitively, Qs can be
viewed as a symmetric version of Q, where symmetry is with respect to the candidates in W1∩W2.
In particular in Qs it holds that:
(a) the fm,p-score of W2 is higher than the fm,p-score of W1,
(b) the fm,1-score of c1 is higher than that of c2, and
(c) the fm,1-scores of all candidates from W1 ∩W2 are equal.
There exists λ ∈ N such that in election Q1 = λζ(W1 ∪W2) +Qs each candidate from W1 ∪W2
has higher fm,1-score than each candidate outside ofW1∪W2. By Observation 1, it is clear that the
fm,1-score of candidate c1 in Q1 is higher than that of candidate c2. Intuitively, this transformation
allows us to focus only on the candidates from W1 ∪W2.
Now, let c be a fixed arbitrary candidate from W1 ∩W2. We construct election Q2 using Q1 in
the following way.
(i) If in Q1 the fm,1-score of c is higher than the fm,1-score of c1, then we define Q2 as a linear
combination Q2 = λ1Q1 + λ2ζ
(
{c1, c2}
)
(this is depicted in Figure 4).
(ii) Otherwise, i.e., if in Q1 the fm,1-score of c1 is at least as high as the fm,1-score of c, then we
define Q2 as a linear combination Q2 = λ1Q1 + λ2ζ(W1 ∩W2) (this is depicted in Figure 5).
In each of these two cases we choose the coefficients λ1 and λ2 so that in Q2 it holds that the
fm,1-score of c1 is higher than that of c, which is higher than the fm,1-score of c2. Further, we
choose λ1 and λ2 so that the difference between the fm,1-scores of c and c1 is smaller than the
difference between the fm,1-scores of c and c2. Formally:
fm,1-scoreQ2(c1)− fm,1-scoreQ2(c) < fm,1-scoreQ2(c)− fm,1-scoreQ2(c2). (10)
Why is it possible to choose such λ1 and λ2? We will give a formal argument for Case (i) and it
will be clear that this reasoning can be repeated for Case (ii). Let:
∆1 = fm,1-scoreQ1(c)− fm,1-scoreQ1(c1) and ∆2 = fm,1-scoreQ1(c1)− fm,1-scoreQ1(c2).
Further, let ∆3 denote the difference between the fm,1-scores of the candidates from {c1, c2} and
the fm,1-scores of the candidates outside of {c1, c2} in ζ
(
{c1, c2}
)
. Naturally, there exist natural
numbers p, q ∈ N such that:
∆1 <
p
q
∆3 < ∆1 +
1
2
∆2.
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W1 ∩W2
c1 c2
C \ (W1 ∪W2)
+ W1 ∩W2
c1 c2
C \ (W1 ∪W2)
=
Q1 ζ({c1, c2})
W1 ∩W2
c1 c2
Q2
δ1 < δ2
C \ (W1 ∪W2)
Figure 4: The construction of election Q2 from Q1 in case (i). The “x-axis” corresponds to
candidates and the “y-axis” corresponds to their fm,1-scores. Here, δ1 and δ2 denote, respectively,
the differences between the scores of c and c1 and the difference between the scores of c and c2.
The shape of the election ζ
(
{c1, c2}
)
is justified in Observation 1.
W1 ∩W2
c1 c2
C \ (W1 ∪W2)
+ W1 ∩W2
c1 c2
C \ (W1 ∪W2)
=
Q1 ζ(W1 ∩W2)
W1 ∩W2
c1 c2
Q2
δ1 < δ2
C \ (W1 ∪W2)
Figure 5: The construction of election Q2 from Q1 in case (ii); the interpretation of the figure is
the same as for Figure 4. The shape of the election ζ(W1 ∩W2) is justified in Observation 4.
We set λ1 = q and λ2 = p, and from the above inequality we get that:
λ1∆1 < λ2∆3 < λ1
(
∆1 +
1
2
∆2
)
. (11)
Observe that:
fm,1-scoreQ2(c1)− fm,1-scoreQ2(c) = −λ1∆1 + λ2∆3 > 0,
fm,1-scoreQ2(c)− fm,1-scoreQ2(c2) = λ1(∆1 +∆2)− λ2∆3 > −λ1∆1 + λ2∆3
= fm,1-scoreQ2(c1)− fm,1-scoreQ2(c).
(The second inequality above is equivalent to 2λ1∆1 + λ1∆2 − 2λ2∆3 > 0, and thus follows from
inequality (11).) Next, we construct Q3 as Q3 = λ4Q2+ ζ
(
W1 ∩W2 \ {c}
)
, where λ4 is a very large
number so that in Q3 we still have that fm,1-scoreQ3(c1) > fm,1-scoreQ3(c) > fm,1-scoreQ3(c2) and
that in Q3 inequality (10) still holds, yet the fm,1-score of c is slightly lower than the fm,1-scores
of the other candidates from W1 ∩W2. Election Q3 is depicted in Figure 6.
Given the fm,1-scores of the candidates in Q3, by our inductive assumption the unique size-
(p−1) winning committee consists of c1 and all the candidates from W1∩W2 \{c}. By committee-
enlargement monotonicity, we conclude that all size-p winning committees for Q3 are of the form
{c1} ∪ (W1 ∩ W2 \ {c}) ∪ {c
′}, where c′ is some other candidate. Let W ′ be one such winning
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(W1 ∩W2) \ {c}
c1 c2
C \ (W1 ∪W2)
c c′
p− 1 candidates
W1
Figure 6: Illustration of election Q3. The interpretation of the figure is the same as for Figure 4.
committee. We know that it cannot be the case that c′ = c (i.e., W1 cannot be winning in Q3).
This is so, because in Q3 the fm,p-score of W2 is higher than the fm,p-score of W1 (since it was
higher already in Qs, and we added only elections which are symmetric with respect to W1 and
W2—this symmetry follows from Observation 1). Thus, by the properties of the fm,1-scores of the
candidates (see Figure 6), c′ must be some candidate such that:
fm,1-scoreQ3(c
′) ≤ fm,1-scoreQ3(c2),
and, in particular c′ may simply be c2 (but it also may be some other candidate). From the above
inequality and from inequality (10) (which holds for Q3 as well) we get that:
fm,1-scoreQ3(c1)− fm,1-scoreQ3(c) < fm,1-scoreQ3(c)− fm,1-scoreQ3(c
′).
We note that in Q3 committee W
′ has higher score than any committee containing c (otherwise,
since W ′ is winning in Q3 and by the above analysis, it would mean that W1 is winning in Q3,
which is not the case).
Next, we construct election Q′3 by swapping candidates c1 and c
′ in each vote in Q3. Committee
W ′ is also winning in Q′3 and thus it has higher score in Q
′
3 than any committee containing c.
Similarly, by symmetry, we infer that:
fm,1-scoreQ′
3
(c′)− fm,1-scoreQ′
3
(c) < fm,1-scoreQ′
3
(c)− fm,1-scoreQ′
3
(c1).
Finally, we construct election Q4 by taking one copy of Q3 and one copy of Q
′
3. Observe that:
fm,1-scoreQ4(c) = fm,1-scoreQ3(c) + fm,1-scoreQ′3(c)
> fm,1-scoreQ3(c1)− fm,1-scoreQ3(c) + fm,1-scoreQ3(c
′)
+ fm,1-scoreQ′
3
(c′)− fm,1-scoreQ′
3
(c) + fm,1-scoreQ′
3
(c1)
= fm,1-scoreQ4(c1) + fm,1-scoreQ4(c
′)− fm,1-scoreQ4(c).
We can rewrite the above inequality as:
fm,1-scoreQ4(c) >
1
2
(
fm,1-scoreQ4(c1) + fm,1-scoreQ4(c
′)
)
.
Since fm,1-scoreQ4(c1) = fm,1-scoreQ4(c
′) (election Q4 is symmetric with respect to c1 and c
′) we
get that fm,1-scoreQ4(c) > fm,1-scoreQ4(c
′) and fm,1-scoreQ4(c) > fm,1-scoreQ4(c1). Thus, the fm,1-
score of c in Q4 is among the fm,1-scores of the (p− 1) top-scored candidates. From our inductive
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assumption and from committee-enlargement monotonicity we infer that each winning committee
in Q4 must contain c. This contradicts the fact that W
′ is winning in Q4, and proves equation (8).
Thus setting:
α =
fm,p(I
∗)− fm,p(J
∗)∑
i∈I∗ fm,1(i)−
∑
i∈J∗ fm,1(i)
,
we get that for any two consecutive elements, I and J , on path S it holds that:
fm,p(I)− fm,p(J) = α
(∑
i∈I
fm,1(i)−
∑
i∈J
fm,1(i)
)
. (12)
By a simple induction over the path S we can show that the above equality holds for any I and J
(I and J do not have to be consecutive elements in S). Consequently, we get that fm,p is a linear
transformation of the function gm,p(I) =
∑
i∈I fm,1(i), thus they yield the same committee scoring
rule. This proves our inductive step, and completes the proof.
Elkind et al. [25] and Barbera` and Coelho [7] point out that committee-enlargement monotonic-
ity is an extremely natural requirement for multiwinner rules whose role is to select committees
of individually excellent candidates. For example, if some k candidates are good enough to be
shortlisted for receiving some award, then increasing k should not lead to any of them losing their
nominations. Thus, intuitively, Theorem 4.7 says that if one is interested in a committee scor-
ing rule for choosing individually excellent candidates, then one should look within the class of
separable rules. This refines and reinforces the recommendation provided by Theorem 4.1, which
suggested looking among weakly separable rules.
Yet, one could challenge this recommendation. For example, SNTV is separable, but it is
also representation-focused and there is some evidence that its behavior is closer to that of the
Chamberlin–Courant rule (which is seen as selecting committees representing a diverse spectrum
of opinions; recall the discussion after Theorem 4.5), than to that of, say, k-Borda (which is seen
as selecting individually excellent candidates). Such evidence is provided, for example, by Elkind
et al. [24], who evaluated a number of committee scoring rules experimentally, by computing their
results on elections obtained from several two-dimensional Euclidean models and presenting them
graphically. Nonetheless, in real-life settings even SNTV is sometimes used for choosing individually
excellent candidates. As a piece of anecdotal evidence, let us mention that while preparing this
paper, we have ran into a news article that listed 10 best ski-jumpers of all time. The criterion for
inclusion on that list was the number of times a given sportsman had won an individual competition
of the ski-jumping World Cup. In other words, all the individual World Cup competitions that
ever took place were seen as “voters,” ranking all the sportsmen from the winner to the loser, and
then SNTV was used to select the “committee” of 10 best ski-jumpers of all time.10
Theorems 4.1 and 4.7 have yet another interesting consequence. They imply that committee-
enlargement monotonicity of a committee scoring rule implies its non-crossing monotonicity. This is
somehow surprising, since the two variants of monotonicity seem almost unrelated as one describes
how the result of an election changes if we increase the size of the committee and the other one—
what happens when we shift a member of a winning committee in a preference relation of a voter.
10Naturally, the sets of ski-jumpers participating in the contests were often different. Formally, we would say that
the participating sportsmen were ranked according to their result in the competition and all the non-participating
ones were ranked below, in some arbitrary order. Since we are using SNTV, the order in which the non-participants
are ranked is irrelevant.
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Corollary 4.11. If a committee scoring rule is committee-enlargement monotone, then it is also
non-crossing monotone.
5 Related Work
Over the last few years, multiwinner voting has attracted significant interest within the compu-
tational social choice literature, but it has also been studied for much longer within social choice
theory and within economics. Below we briefly review this literature (for a more detailed review,
we point the readers to the overview of Faliszewski et al. [33]; we have also mentioned many related
papers in the context of respective results).
Axiomatic studies of voting rules were initiated by Arrow [1], and in a somehow more narrow
framework, by May [54]. Single-winner scoring rules are perhaps the best understood among
single-winner election systems. Axiomatic characterizations of this class were provided, e.g., by
Ga¨rdenfors [39], Smith [79], and Young [84], and in a more general setting, by Myerson [57] and
Pivato [64]. More specific axiomatic characterizations of single-winner scoring rules include those
of the Borda rule [83, 42, 38, 79], of the Plurality rule [69, 19], and of the Antiplurality rule [8]
(see also the overviews of Chebotarev and Shamis [18] and of Merlin [55]). Classic works on
axiomatic properties of multiwinner rules include those of Dummett [23], Gehrlein [40], Felsenthal
and Maoz [35], Debord [22], Ratliff [67], and Barbera` and Coelho [7].
Our work mostly builds on that of Elkind et al. [25] where the authors introduced the class
of committee scoring rules and many of the notions on which we rely, such as candidate mono-
tonicity, non-crossing monotonicity and committee enlargement-monotonicity (regarding the latter
one, see also the work of Barbera` and Coelho [7]). In particular, Elkind et al. [25] identified the
classes of (weakly) separable and representation-focused rules and provided some of their basic fea-
tures. OWA-based rules were introduced by Skowron et al. [74], who analyzed their computational
properties (and who, in fact, studied a somewhat more general model). Faliszewski et al. [31, 32]
introduced the class of top-k-counting rules and the ℓp-Borda and q-HarmonicBorda rules.
Recently Skowron et al. [76] characterized the class of committee scoring rules using the axioms
of consistency, symmetry, continuity, and weak efficiency. Our paper can be seen as complementary
to theirs: They study committee scoring rules as opposed to all the other multiwinner rules, whereas
we focus on the internal structure of the class.
Aziz et al. [2, 5] studied a class of approval-based rules that is very similar to the class of
committee scoring rules (the class was first introduced by Thiele [80] in the 19th century, but was
forgotten for some time; some of Thiele’s rules were recalled by Kilgour [46] and then by Aziz et
al.). Lackner and Skowron [49] studied axiomatic properties of these rules and highlighted their
axiomatic similarity to committee scoring rules. Recently, monotonicity notions similar to those
studied in this paper were also considered in the context of approval-based multiwinner rules [70, 49].
For more general discussions of the properties of approval-based rules we point the reader to the
work of Kilgour and Marshall [47].
The study of computational properties of committee scoring rules in general, and of specific
rules, such as Chamberlin–Courant and Proportional Approval Voting, has attracted significant
attention. This line of work has started with the paper of Procaccia et al. [65], who have shown
that an approval-based variant of Chamberlin–Courant is NP-hard to compute. The same result
for the classic, Borda-based variant was shown by Lu and Boutilier [51]. Betzler et al. [9] considered
parameterized complexity of the rule, whereas the study of approximation algorithms was initiated
by Lu and Boutilier [51], who have given a polynomial-time (1− 1
e
)-approximation algorithm (this
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algorithm, based on the greedy procedure of Nemhauser et al. [58] for submodular functions, has
since then been adapted to other committee scoring rules as well). Skowron et al. [75] improved this
result by providing a polynomial-time approximation scheme for the Borda-based variant; Skowron
and Faliszewski [73] gave an FPT approximation scheme for the approval-based variant (and argued
why the (1 − 1
e
)-approximation algorithm is the best we can hope for among polynomial-time
algorithms). The complexity of Chamberlin–Courant was also studied in much depth for various
restricted domains, including the single-peaked domain [9, 20, 59], the single-crossing domain [78],
and a number of others [85, 48, 60]. Faliszewski et al. [34, 28] considered a number of heuristic
algorithms.
Proportional Approval Voting (PAV) received a bit less attention than the Chamberlin–Courant
rule, but due to the work of Aziz et al. [2] on justified representation, it is now being studied with
increasing interest (briefly put, Aziz et al. have shown that PAV is remarkably good at providing
committees that represent the voters proportionally, as also confirmed by Brill et al. [14]; see the
work of Brill et al. [13] for another rule with similar properties). The rule was shown to be NP-hard
to compute [5, 74], but the standard greedy (1 − 1
e
)-approximation algorithm works for it. Very
recently, Byrka et al. [15] have shown a different, apparently much more powerful algorithm. The
rule was also considered in the context of restricted domains [59]. FPT approximation schemes for
PAV and other OWA-based rules were provided by Skowron [72].
More general computational results regarding committee scoring rules were provided by Skowron
et al. [74], who studied the complexity and approximability of OWA-based rules, by Faliszewski et
al. [31], for top-k-counting rules, by Peters [59], for OWA-based rules in the single-peaked domain,
and by Faliszewski et al. [28], who introduced several general-purpose heuristic algorithms.
Naturally, there exist many interesting multiwinner rules beyond the class of committee scoring
rules. These include, for example, Single Transferable Vote (see, e.g., the work of Tideman and
Richardson [81]), a number of rules based on the Condorcet principle [3, 7, 21, 27, 36, 37, 40, 67, 71],
Monroe’s rule [56], and different variants of the rule invented by Phragme´n [61, 62, 63, 44, 13]. For
an overview of electoral systems used to select committees of representatives in practice, we refer
the reader to the book of Lijphart and Grofman [50].
6 Conclusion
We have studied the class of committee scoring rules and explored the interesting hierarchy formed
by its subclasses studied to date (including the class of decomposable rules introduced in this
paper). We have highlighted several fundamental properties of committee scoring rules, ranging
from the nonimposition property (i.e., that for every committee and every nontrivial committee
scoring rule, there is an election where this committee wins uniquely under this rule), to quite a
varied landscape of monotonicity notions. This allowed us to partially match syntactic properties
of such rules to their normative properties.
There is a number of follow-up directions for this research. For example, whole-committee
monotonicity (where all the members of the committee are shifted forward) is an interesting prop-
erty. The axiomatic characterization of OWA-based rules remains an open problem. Further, it is
interesting to see whether there exist other properties, e.g., those which relate to proportionality of
representation, that can be used to characterize different (subclasses of) committee scoring rules,
or other multiwinner election systems (the works of Aziz et al. [2] and Lackner and Skowron [49]
made some headway in this direction). A formal axiomatic study which would allow to compare
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committee scoring rules to other multiwinner election systems is an important, yet challenging
question.
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A Appendix
In this section we prove two basic properties of committee scoring rules. The first one is nonim-
position, which requires that for every committee there is an election where this committee wins
uniquely (recall Definition 2.3 in Section 2.3). We show that all non-degenerate committee scoring
rules have the nonimposition property. In the proof we use elections ζ(S) introduced in Section 4.2.
Lemma 2.2. Let Rf be a committee scoring rule defined by a family of committee scoring functions
f = (fm,k)k≤m. The rule Rf satisfies the nonimposition property if and only if every committee
scoring function in f is nontrivial.
Proof. The trivial rule does not satisfy the nonimposition property. If Rf is nontrivial, then for
each committee W , by Lemma 4.9, election ζ(W ) witnesses that Rf satisfies nonimposition.
The next observation will be useful a bit later.
Observation 2. Consider two committees, W1 and W2, such that |W1 ∩W2| = k − 1. In election
ζ(W1∪W2)+ζ(W1∩W2), committees W1 and W2 are the only winning ones. Indeed, by Lemma 4.9
we know that all W with W ⊆W1∪W2 are winning in ζ(W1∪W2) and that all W with W1∩W2 ⊆W
are winning in ζ(W1 ∩W2). The only two committees winning in both elections are W1 and W2.
Since committee scoring rules satisfy consistency [76], we conclude that W1 and W2 are the only
winners in ζ(W1 ∪W2) + ζ(W1 ∩W2).
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Next we give a proof of Lemma 2.1, by showing that two committee scoring functions (for a
given number of candidates m and size k of the committees) define the same rule (for these m
and k) if and only if they are linearly related.
Lemma 2.1. Let Rf and Rg be two committee scoring rules defined by committee scoring functions
f = (fm,k)k≤m and g = (gm,k)k≤m, respectively. If Rf = Rg then for each m and k, k ≤ m, there
are two values, am,k ∈ R+ and bm,k ∈ R, such that for each I ∈ [m]k we have that fm,k(I) =
am,k · gm,k(I) + bm,k.
Proof. Let us fix m and k. Let Imax = (1, 2, . . . , k) and Imin = (m− k+1,m− k+2, . . . ,m) be two
committee positions, the former consisting of top k positions and the latter consisting of bottom k
ones. The statement of the lemma clearly holds when fm,k(Imax) = fm,k(Imin) as then Rf is trivial,
and so g must be constant. Thus from now on we assume that f(Imax) > f(Imin). Let hm,k be a
linear transformation of gm,k such that fm,k(Imax) = hm,k(Imax) and fm,k(Imin) = hm,k(Imin). It
is apparent that h and g implement the same multiwinner rule. We will show that fm,k = hm,k,
which is sufficient to complete the proof. For the sake of contradiction let us assume that this is
not the case.
Since fm,k 6= hm,k, there must exist I
∗ such that fm,k(I
∗) 6= hm,k(I
∗); let us assume that
fm,k(I
∗) > hm,k(I
∗). There exists a sequence S of committee positions from [m]k, starting with
Imax, containing I
∗, and ending in Imin, such that for each two consecutive elements, I and J , in
the sequence (i.e., when J appears right after I in the sequence) it holds that:
(i) |I ∩ J | = k − 1, and
(ii) I dominates J .
For instance, for m = 5, k = 2 and I∗ = (2, 4), the sequence S could be
((1, 2), (1, 3), (1, 4), (2, 4), (2, 5), (3, 5), (4, 5)) (note that this sequence does not need to contain all
possible committee positions and, thus, it is easy to form it).
Consider function ψ = fm,k − hm,k. Since f(Imax) = h(Imax) and f(Imin) = h(Imin), we have
that ψ(Imin) = 0 and ψ(Imax) = 0. Additionally, we know that ψ(I
∗) > 0. Thus there exist
committee positions I, J, I ′, J ′ ∈ [m]k such that J is right after I and J
′ is right after I ′ in the
sequence S, and such that ψ(I) ≤ 0, ψ(J) > 0, ψ(I ′) > 0, and ψ(J ′) ≤ 0 (it might be the case that
J = I ′). That is:
f(I) ≤ h(I), f(J) > h(J), f(I ′) > h(I ′), and f(J ′) ≤ h(J ′).
Combining these inequalities, and taking into account that I dominates J , and that I ′ dominates
J ′, we get that:
0 ≤ f(I)− f(J) < h(I)− h(J) and f(I ′)− f(J ′) > h(I ′)− h(J ′) ≥ 0.
This means that there exist two positive integers, x, y ∈ N, such that:
f(I)− f(J)
f(I ′)− f(J ′)
<
y
x
<
h(I) − h(J)
h(I ′)− h(J ′)
and, in consequence:
x(f(I)− f(J)) < y(f(I ′)− f(J ′)) and x(h(I) − h(J)) > y(h(I ′)− h(J ′)).
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Let us fix two committees, W1 and W2, with |W1 ∩W2| = k − 1, and consider an election E with
x + y voters, where in x votes W1 stands on position I and W2 on position J , and in y votes W1
stands on position J ′ and W2 stands on position I
′. We can add to E a sufficient number of copies
of election ζ(W1 ∪W2) + ζ(W1 ∩W2) (recall Section 4.2 for the definition of ζ). By Observation 2,
we know that in election ζ(W1 ∪ W2) + ζ(W1 ∩ W2) only committees W1 and W2 are winning.
Consequently, if we add a sufficient number of copies of this election to E, we can ensure that in
E only W1, W2, or both W1 and W2 can be winners. Since the elections which we added to E
are symmetric with respect to W1 and W2, the outcome of the election (i.e., whether W1 or W2 is
winning) depends only on election E. However, according to f committee W1 has lower score than
W2, so the latter should be winning. Yet, by looking at h we come to the opposite conclusion. This
gives a contradiction and proves that f = h. This completes the proof.
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